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Abstract 
This project report examines the European Court of Justice‟s influence on the development of 
European social policy, focusing on social benefits in relation to free movement. Therefore, the 
purpose of this project is to examine the EU Member States‟ opportunities to influence the common 
social policy, and the European Court of Justice's role in this process. Especially, the development 
of the power of the European Court of Justice is emphasized. The point of departure is the book 
European Social Policy – Between Fragmentation and Integration (1995) by Leibfried and Pierson, 
which addresses the common social policy of the European Union from the Treaty of Rome to 
1995. The theories of Historical Institutionalism and Path Dependence are applied in order to track 
the development. 
 
Firstly, the analysis examines the development of social policy from the Treaty of Rome to the 
Maastricht Treaty. Secondly, the introduction of the Union Citizenship is explored to identify its 
implications on the free movement, and the citizens‟ options for receiving social benefits in 
Member States than their home state. Lastly, the implementation and consequences of the Directive 
2004/38/EC, also called the Citizenship Directive, is examined in the context of key events such as 
the Eastern Enlargement and the Eurozone crisis. Throughout the analysis, relevant ECJ cases, like 
the Sala and Vatsouras cases, are included in order to explain the impact of case law on the 
development of European social policy. 
 
The project report concludes that the Member States' options to make significant changes to the 
path of European social policy has been limited gradually. This is because the ECJ over time has 
gained a considerable authority on this policy area. This extent of power largely derives from 
vaguely formulated legislation, which has necessitated judicial creativity from the ECJ. Thus, a 
court-decision trap has been formed, which is exceedingly difficult for the Member States to escape. 
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List of abbreviations 
CEE: Central and Eastern Europe 
EC: European Community 
ECJ: European Court of Justice  
EEC Treaty: European Economic Community Treaty  
EMU: European Monetary Union 
ESF: European Social Fund 
EU: European Union 
HI: Historical Institutionalism 
OMC: Open Method of Coordination 
QMV: Qualified Majority Vote 
SAP: Social Action Program 
SEA: Single European Act  
SEM: Single European Market 
TEU: Treaty on the European Union  
TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UK: United Kingdom 
 
Glossary 
Acquis communautaire: The accumulated body of EU law, including treaties, directives, and 
jurisprudence. 
 
Citizenship Directive:  Refers to Directive 2004/38/EC. 
 
Council: Refers to the Council of Ministers 
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Court-decision trap: A term used by Gerda Falkner. It is described as; “an extreme form of the 
joint-decision trap. The ECJ decides on the basis of EU primary law and therefore, the EU 
institutions have no powers of revision under the policy-making procedures as provided in the 
Treaties” (Martinsen & Falkner, 2011:19) 
 
Effet Utile: The doctrine of “Effectiveness”. “The doctrine provides that once the purpose of a 
provision is clearly identified, its detailed terms will be interpreted so "as to ensure that the 
provision retains its effectiveness”” (Fennelly, 1996: 674). 
 
EU: is utilized as an umbrella term for the organization that is now called the European Union. 
 
EU organizations: The supranational organizations based in EU, such as the Council of Ministers, 
the European Court of Justice, the European Parliament and the EU Commission. 
 
Institutions (formal and informal): Norms, rules, and structures that actors enact policy within. 
Formal rules describe rules, which are written down (i.e. treaties, regulations etc.) and informal 
rules are rules that are not written, but still usually followed (i.e. the norms of EU policy-making or 
ECJ jurisprudence) 
 
Judicialization of politics: Refers to a process whereby judicial law-making influences the 
behaviour of non-judicial agents of governance. 
 
Migrant workers: Workers migrating to another country to work. In our study, it refers to Union 
citizens migrating to another Member State in order to work.  
 
Social dumping: A situation in which national employers hire foreign workers, who have wages 
and working conditions below the national level of the host Member State. 
 
Social policy: Refers to policy affecting conditions of citizens, primarily in relation to welfare. In 
this project social policy is almost exclusively utilized in connection with social benefits and free 
movement in the EU, and the common European law regarding this. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
1. 1 Problem Area 
Since its origin, the European Union (EU) has taken ongoing steps toward further integration. What 
began as cooperation between six countries in the European Coal and Steel Community has 
developed into one of the most complex cooperations between sovereign states ever observed. 
Today, the EU is an economic and political union comprising 28 Member States and functions both 
by supranational independent institutions and by intergovernmental decision-making. It continues to 
make efforts towards both horizontal and vertical integration, as well as widening and deepening 
policy areas, where the EU has competences. 
  
One of the central achievements of the European integration process is the „four freedoms‟, which 
are embedded in the single market. These four cornerstones of the single market are the free 
movement of goods, capital, services, and persons and are to be secured through the removal of 
physical, technical and fiscal barriers (European Union, N.d. a). The removal of these barriers is 
exercised through different institutions and approaches. The European Court of Justice is a central 
actor, as it rules on the implementation of primary and secondary legislation, and seeks to change 
national legislation hindering these freedoms (Foster, 2012: 62). The interplay between the four 
freedoms, the Eastern enlargement and the Eurozone crisis might have put the Member States under 
pressure.  
 
In 2004, the largest enlargement in the history of the EU with ten countries joining occurred, "(...) 
marking the re-unification of Europe" (European Commission, 2013) and two more joined three 
years later. However, it was agreed that there was a need for transitional periods, whereby the free 
movement of workers from the new countries were restricted in order to make sure that the labour 
markets of the old Member States were not harmed by the joining countries. Those restrictions were 
lifted respectively in 2011 and by the end of 2013. This, among other things, led to a heated public 
debate in several countries on the implications on national social systems of the free movement and 
opportunities of moving Union citizens to receive social benefits. As the debate heated, some 
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Member States proclaimed their dissatisfaction through a joint letter to the Commission, requesting 
that action was taken to protect their social security systems. 
 
This letter from ministers of four Member States was sent to the Irish EU-Presidency in April 2013 
regarding welfare tourism. These Member States, being Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, expressed a growing concern that EU law on social benefits were exploited by 
recipients that were not genuinely interested in contributing to the single market through work. 
According to these Member States, the issue was the common European social policy‟s potential to 
be misused through fraud and abuse. They wrote, i.e.:  
 
"Arrangements at national or EU level that allow those who have only recently arrived in a Member 
State and have never been employed or paid taxes there to claim the same social security benefits as 
that Member State's own citizens are an affront to common sense and ought to be reviewed 
urgently." (Freidrich et. al. 2013: 4) 
 
This letter was not the first time for the issue of benefit tourism to be discussed. A fear had existed 
for a long period, especially among the wealthier Member States, for their welfare systems and 
labour markets not being able to withstand the influx of persons from poorer Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) Member States seeking work or benefits. This issue was most prevalent around the 
time of the Eastern enlargement of 2004 and 2007, and again during the Eurozone crisis beginning 
in 2008. In this period, some Member States, already under economic pressure, did not want to pay 
benefits to non-nationals and thereby strain their national welfare systems further.  
 
The perception that some Member States want to take measures within the European social policy 
field have fostered an interest in the opportunities that Member States actually have to influence and 
change the EU‟s power within the field of social policy. When exploring academic literature on 
European social policy, it is clear that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has played a crucial role 
in the development of a common European social policy. As Pierson & Leibfried (1995: 437f) 
expresses: “(…) any analysis of policy evolution in the European Union must acknowledge the 
Court‟s crucial role in expanding European public authority”. Hence, this project report 
emphasises the ECJ‟s role, while investigating which opportunities the Member States have to alter 
the course of European social policy.  
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The question remains; why has no large scale action by the Member States been taken in order to 
end the assumed welfare tourism, or at least to hinder the further integration on European social 
policy? This question is especially relevant seen in light of the possibility that the time around the 
Eastern enlargement and the Eurozone crisis was a time of change for the social policy area. These 
outcomes could change the path of the EU in relation to social policy and further integration. 
However, this has seemingly not yet happened, and the reasons for this are examined in this project 
report in a historical perspective. As it seems apparent that the role of the ECJ is central in this 
regard, as emphasized by other scholars, it has led to the following problem formulation: 
 
1.2 Problem formulation: 
How has the ECJ accumulated such an extent of power on the European social policy area, and 
how come the Member States have allowed it?  
  
1.3 Analysis Strategy 
In this section, the analysis strategy is outlined in order to create an understanding of how this 
project intends to answer the problem formulation and assess the corresponding hypothesis.  
 
The analysis consists of four main parts, and a subsequent discussion of the results. The first part 
examines the historical setting of European social policy by looking into the progress from the 
Treaty of Rome to the Treaty of Maastricht. The second part examines the impact of the Maastricht 
treaty and the introduction of the Union citizenship. Furthermore, the third part of the analysis 
focuses on the key event of the Eastern enlargement and the policies resulting from it, such as the 
Citizenship Directive. The last part analyses the effect of this directive, and the Eurozone crisis. 
Through this, the development of the ECJ and its influence on social policy is likewise researched. 
The purpose of this is to determine how the ECJ has accumulated such authority in European social 
policy, and why the Member States have allowed it. Through the framework of historical 
institutionalism, it will be discussed to what extend Joint-decision traps, path dependence and 
spillover process influence the development of European social policy.  
 
The analysis has its point of departure in the work by Leibfried & Pierson (Eds.) in the book 
European Social Policy – Between Fragmentation and Integration (1995). This book examines the 
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state of European social policy from the establishment of the EU and up to 1995, when it was 
published. It is included as an inspiration to the assumptions on the relative power of the EU 
organizations. Thus, it will provide a starting point for the further analysis, as the formal and 
informal institutions under which EU actors and organizations operate up to that point are 
identified. The hypotheses that are used as the basis for the different parts of the analysis, are 
derived from presumptions founded in the work from Leibfried and Pierson. 
 
The first part of the analysis focuses on the historical development of European social policy, and 
aims to explore the validity of hypothesis 1:  
 
The development of a common European economic policy necessitated the 
establishment of a European social policy, but due to lack of political willpower, 
the ECJ became the leading integrative force. 
 
This is assessed mainly by tracking the way treaties, and to some extent regulations, reflect the 
development of  this policy area and the Member States' scope of action within the Council from the 
Rome Treaty up to the Maastricht Treaty. Simultaneously, the role of the ECJ in this period is 
examined by looking at its competences and the way it has accumulated power through its 
judgments. This is approached by historical institutionalism and path dependence in order to map 
the beginning of European social policy and the path that is established early in the process. This 
approach is used, wherein early events play a significant role in determining the path and at the 
same time makes it more resistant to change, according to the included theories. 
 
The second part explores hypothesis 2:  
 
Although the introduction of a Union Citizenship in the Maastricht treaty was 
largely symbolic, the ECJ used the vague wording to interpret the provision in a 
way that restricted the Member States‟ autonomy 
 
This is approached by analyzing the development taking place after the implementation of the 
Maastricht Treaty and until the Eastern enlargement. This period of time had a huge effect on 
European social policy because many important initiatives were introduced. First and maybe most 
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importantly the Union citizenship was introduced with the Maastricht Treaty, which was used by 
the ECJ in the case law regarding social policy. Likewise, the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice were 
introduced in this period. 
 
In the third part of the analysis, the key event of the Eastern Enlargement and the policies adopted 
because of this event are examined. This is explored on the basis of the following hypothesis:  
 
The combination of the recent case law and the looming Eastern Enlargement 
caused the Member States to be more protective about national welfare systems 
and consequently the Citizenship Directive, transitional restrictions and 
regulation 883/2004 was an answer to that. 
 
Here, the focus is mainly on the transitional restrictions imposed on the ascending states, and the 
Citizenship Directive. The reasoning behind this directive is examined, as it has greatly affected the 
social policy of the Union, primarily through interpretations by the ECJ. 
  
This paves the way for answering the fourth hypothesis:  
 
Despite the implementation of the Citizenship Directive, the ECJ still exhibits 
judicial activism, which has caused dissatisfaction among Member States due to 
the economic crisis and the end of transitional restrictions. 
 
The interpretations of the previous analyses are a part of the fourth analysis, which reviews the key 
events of the EU after the implementation of the Citizenship Directive. These are the introduction of 
the Lisbon Treaty, the rulings by the ECJ on the basis of the Citizenship Directive and the events of 
the Eurozone crisis, as well as the end of the previously mentioned transitional restrictions. They 
are chosen because they signify large changes in the EU, both in its political framework and the 
general structure and balance of power between Member States, as well as the ECJ.  
 
These events are analysed in order to identify and understand the path that EU integration follows in 
relation to social benefits and free movement, as well as to examine the feedback of this in order to 
find the conditions under which the ECJ has gained its level of influence. This is viewed in the 
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context of path dependence, which is applied in order to find out how these key events have 
affected the development of institutions, both formal and informal, under which the actors operate. 
This is achieved both by looking at the relevant law instigated by these events and the relevant 
actors' preferences relating to this. An analysis of the Eurozone crisis is also conducted, as it is the 
most recent key event, to contextualise the previous parts of the analysis, and thus unify the 
different perspectives in a comprehensive answer to the questions raised by this project report. 
 
The jurisprudence of the ECJ is also analysed throughout this project, as the ECJ has become an 
important actor regarding protection of citizens‟ rights to free movement and social benefits in other 
Member States. Thus, the ECJ has played a critical role in the expansion of the EU‟s authority on 
social policy in the Member States. This is analyzed because the ECJ, by many scholars, including 
Leibfried and Pierson in European Social Policy – Between Fragmentation and Integration (1995), 
has been described as activist in its approach by trying to further develop European integration 
through its rulings. Thus, the purpose of this part is to find the basis for these current rulings and 
depict the institutional framework under which the ECJ works. Additionally, a discussion on 
whether a possible development in the power of the ECJ can be considered a positive or a negative 
development for the Member States. This is discussed on the basis of the findings of the previous 
analyses, and aims to consider the development from another aspect than the analysis. 
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1.5 Delimitation 
It is necessary to establish some general limitations in order to attain a deeper understanding of the 
problem formulation. Therefore, the following section outlines the limitations of this project report 
in relation to policy areas, timeframe and actors. 
 
The question of whether welfare or benefit tourism is a problem, and to what extent, is not 
researched in this project report, as this problem and the debate about it only acts as a way to 
establish the contemporary relevance of this project report and as an introductory approach. 
Therefore, the advantages and disadvantages of a common European social policy are not 
researched, since the focus of this project is the historical development, as well as the interaction 
between EU organisations and Member States regarding the social policy area.  
 
The term “social policy” can cover a wide range of policy areas; gender equality policy, economic 
redistribution in general or regulations on the area of health and safety can be seen as measures in 
this category. Pierson and Leibfried (1995) refer to a very broad definition of social policy, 
described by T. H. Marshall as the use of “(...) political power to supersede, supplement or modify 
operations of the economic system in order to achieve results which the economic system could not 
achieve on its own” (Pierson & Leibfried, 1995a: 3). The focus of our research is, however, on the 
national welfare benefits of a financial nature, as these have traditionally been reserved the Member 
States' authority. As Leibfried and Pierson describes their use of the term: “(…) traditional 
components of the welfare state (…)” (Leibfried & Pierson 1995: 43). Thereby, other parts of social 
policy, such as health and safety at work, are not considered in this project report.  
 
When researching with a historical institutionalist approach, the timeframe, and thus empirical 
limitation is an important aspect to consider. One could argue that research on the EU could go as 
far back as the European Coal and Steel Community, depending on what subject is under 
consideration. In our analysis, we go back to the Treaty of Rome, which established the European 
Economic Community in 1957. Thus, developments within the European Coal and Steel 
Community are not within the scope of research. Though the aim of the analysis is to explain a 
contemporary event, being the significant power that the ECJ seems to have achieved, the approach 
of historical institutionalism and path dependence emphasize that early events matter. 
Consequently, early events as well as later events of the development are examined in order to 
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determine how the role of the ECJ and the general development of European social policy have 
developed. As the time frame of the research is rather wide, some delimitation of actors is needed in 
order to be able to thoroughly examine the key events within the time frame. The delimitation of 
actors is outlined below. 
 
1.5.1 Actors and organizations 
As the focus of this project is on European integration in the field of social policy, within the scope 
of EU institutions, it is delimited from considering institutions and politics on the national level. 
This dimension could have contributed to a more nuanced analysis of Member States‟ actions 
within EU institutions such as the Council of Ministers, and provided a broader understanding of 
the context for actions. However, this dimension is not the main focus of this project report and is 
therefore not considered. What is crucial for the analysis is the EU institutions‟ and Member States‟ 
possibilities to act within them. Therefore actors that only try to influence the decision-making, 
such as NGO‟s and lobby groups, are not considered either.  
 
Furthermore, in order to study the development of the Member States‟ opportunities to act within 
the Council in depth, the European Commission‟s and the European Parliament‟s role within the 
field of social policy will not be investigated thoroughly. Also, the special legislative procedure is 
applied within the area of social security and social protection of workers, and thereby the 
Parliament only has a consulting role. Hence, the role of the European Parliament is supervisory. A 
factor, which could be included, would relate to the agenda-setting role of the Commission. 
However, this will not be included to any greater extent.  
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2. Theoretical Approach 
 
 
2.1 Path dependence in the Context of Historical Institutionalism 
The historical institutionalist approach focuses on institutions over time, as well as conditions under 
which historical events shape political institutions and outcomes (Pollack, 2009: 127). In a broad 
understanding, historical institutionalism focuses on the idea that “history matters” (Pierson, 2000: 
251). Historical institutionalism is applied to our study as a framework through which the issue of 
social policy integration is approached. This implicates that the project report is based on the 
assumption that developed institutions are highly impacted by historical events, and that historical 
events also impact on the establishment of new institutions. Moreover, such events are impacted by 
institutional designs. The historical institutionalist approach affects the methodology of our study, 
which is described in 3.Research Methods. 
 
We will approach a more narrow conception on the basis of path dependence, as described by 
Professor of Political Science Paul Pierson. Within this theory, institutions are considered shaped 
and constrained by previous institutional decisions. The decision to use path dependence is related 
to the use of European Social Policy - Between fragmentation and integration (Leibfried & Pierson 
1995) as a starting point, because the theory is implicitly applied in the study. However, the theory 
of path dependence has developed and matured since their study, which can be seen as an indication 
of its continued applicability.  
 
The theory of path dependence is inspired by both traditional integration theories and theories of 
new institutionalist approaches. It shares the basic assumption of rational choice institutionalism; 
that actors are perceived as "strategic utility-maximizers whose preferences are given" (Pollack, 
2009: 126). Inspired by the historical institutionalist scholar Fritz Scharpf‟s idea of joint-decision 
traps, Pierson argues that governments might experience themselves as “immobilized by the dead 
weight of past initiatives” (Pollack, 2009: 136f). Furthermore, he is inspired by the neo-
functionalist work of Ernst B. Haas in which positive feedback might lead to functional spillover, 
which means that the integration of one area can spill over into another under the right 
circumstances, and thus lead to further integration (Pollack, 2009: 137). However, he breaks with 
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the neo-functionalist logic assuming that an institution only exists because it serves a specific 
function. He stresses that although this might have been the case in the beginning, the 
institutionalization of this institution can make it “locked-in”, whereby the useful purpose erodes 
while the institution remains (Pierson, 2004: 46f). 
 
The term path dependence in social sciences refers to a social process grounded in increasing 
returns, in which it becomes more difficult to change a system as time passes. Timing and sequence 
is crucial to this, as smaller events might impact greatly, when timing is right. It becomes more 
anticipated that an institution will follow a specific path for each step it moves down this path. This 
is due to the fact that the relative benefits of following this path, as well as the costs of reversal, will 
increase the further down the path it moves. It is a part of the positive feedback process described in 
the following (Pierson, 2000: 252).  
 
Institutions are considered resistant to change and their paths almost impossible to reverse due to 
considerable transaction costs. However, institutions might change through the events of critical 
junctures, which shape the political development and usually occurs when the mechanisms 
sustaining the path are overwhelmed by certain conditions. Even smaller events can have great 
implications on both the further movement of an institution in one direction, as well as for change 
towards another, if they are a part of a critical juncture. Moreover, individuals and organizations 
might be encouraged to adapt to new institutions and policies, as they can generate learning- and 
coordination effects (Pierson, 2000: 259). 
  
The sustainability of, or change towards, another system is influenced by positive and negative 
feedbacks. The former refers to the development of incentives for actors to maintain and support the 
institutions. Every step down a particular path has the consequence of increasing the attractiveness 
of that path. In other words; if one institutional practice have a beneficial outcome, this practice will 
be attractive to follow the next time. Thus, if such effects start to accumulate, it will result in a 
powerful self-reinforcing activity (Pierson, 2004: 17f). The latter refers to situations in which 
pressure for change of institutions or policies is developed (Pollack, 2009: 127). The theory does 
not provide a comprehensive explanatory power for the negative feedback processes, due to the 
relative irrelevance in the political sphere. However, as he argues that the theory is not meant as a 
neat way of predicting the future, he also acknowledges that change points can, in fact, occur. 
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Change points will typically happen in the face of exogenous shocks, were the mechanisms that 
previously reinforced the existing path are replaced or disturbed (Pierson, 2000: 266).  
 
Although Pierson argues that lock-in conditions and path dependency makes it increasingly difficult 
for Member States to change direction the further they go down a particular path, he stresses that 
the theory is not meant as a neat way of predicting the future (Pierson 2000: 265). He argues that 
change points can occur when new conditions replaces or disturbs the mechanisms that previously 
reproduced the existing path. These changes can be brought on by "exogenous shocks"  (Pierson 
2000).  
 
Pierson argues that focusing on the positive feedback processes will open up for a more rigorous 
analysis, as the idea is to identify the dynamics of self-reinforcing institutions; not just showing that 
institutions can be “sticky”, but identifying the underlying causal processes (Pierson 2004: 10). In 
general it helps to explain the role of time and history in social analyses (Pierson, 2000: 264). 
However, it is criticized for not being able to test more precise hypothesis, as it is complex and 
involves many variables (Pierson, 2000: 265). Additionally, path dependence has been criticised for 
being unable to predict the future path, as the path of an institution is difficult to predict without a 
longer development. However, as we do not aim to predict the future development, this might not 
influence the project report to such a great extent. 
 
2.2 Judicialization of Politics 
The theory of path dependence has limited explanatory power to offer, when discussing the micro-
level mechanisms of a court-driven impact on the process of development in a non-judicial realm, 
due to its complexity and lack of specificity. The concept of judicialization of politics as described 
by Sweet (2010) can contribute to the theoretical explanation of this phenomenon. Keeping in mind 
that Sweet‟s work is based on neofunctionalist assumptions, the use of this concept can be justified 
on the grounds that 1) the concept of judicialization can be found in many theoretical approaches, 
and 2) the work of Leibfried and Pierson (1995) incorporates some of the neofunctionalist key 
concepts itself, such as spillover.  
  
The judicialization of politics refers to a process, whereby judicial law-making influences the 
behaviour of non-judicial agents of governance. Sweet (2010) describes three conditions that allows 
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for a judicialization process to occur, and he subsequently establishes three types of decisions that 
create a situation, where the legislative bodies of the EU are virtually required to adapt to the case-
law of ECJ. The latter is considered a part of the final analysis of the development of the ECJ‟s 
jurisprudence.  
 
The first condition described is a continuing flow of incoming cases for the court to consider. 
Secondly, the judgments must produce a coherent entity of case-law. The third condition is that the 
legal subjects must acknowledge the judgments and case-law and refer to generated case-law in 
future decision-making (Sweet 2010: 8). These three conditions are examined in light of the 
development of practices and jurisprudence by the ECJ.  
 
2.3 Operationalization 
Through path dependence, the processes leading up to the Member States‟ recent discontent with 
the limitations to their sovereignty as welfare distributors are analyzed. As the path towards specific 
situations is important in order to understand the situation, we aim to go backwards in order to 
reveal the causal processes leading up to status quo. Through this, it might be possible to identify a 
path and the point in time, the critical juncture, where this path began. Furthermore, the 
implications of these possible critical junctures are examined in order to explain the contemporary 
situation and dissatisfaction. Inspired by the work of Leibfried & Pierson (1995), we examine the 
development in, and influence of, the practices of the ECJ in this process, and further include some 
aspects of the Member States‟ involvement in the development.  
 
The jurisprudence and practices of the ECJ are analyzed in order to establish the measures by which 
the ECJ has expanded its authority, as is claimed by Leibfried & Pierson (1995), and to further 
explore the consequences of this accretion of power. We aim to examine the practices and 
jurisprudence of the ECJ; the type of interpretation method applied and the general patterns over 
time, how it established supremacy of EU law, the informal system of precedent, and explore how 
all these measures affect the non-judicial agents in the political realm and plays a part in the 
legislative practices through the application of the concept of judicialization of politics.  
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3. Research Method 
 
 
3.1 Historical Institutionalist Considerations 
One of the methodological considerations, which are important to reflect upon, is the researchers‟ 
role in selecting the dependent variables – that is, deciding which events and institutions to pay 
attention to. This is also one of the recurrent critiques of the historical institutionalist approach, as 
deciding how far back in history to go or which occurrences to pay attention to is crucial to the 
results. In order to respond to this critique, one must make sure that the choices are well grounded 
and must be aware that even the smallest detail can have great significance. 
 
The amount of empirical data is increased through using the work of Leibfried & Pierson, which 
serves two functions; it can to some extent mitigate the small-n critique that historical 
institutionalism has been subject to, and it can allow for a distinction between the correlations of the 
key events and the general patterns over time. The small-n critique includes an assumption of 
historical institutionalism as having an insufficient degree of statistical freedom to generate valid 
data. Another way of responding to the critique is to specify the applicability of the research result. 
In that regard, the results of our study must be viewed as a contribution to the accumulated 
knowledge, not as a substitution. As Pierson & Skocpol expresses it: “(…) individual studies in 
isolation never do more than move the scholarly enterprise a step or two forward,” (Pierson & 
Skocpol 2002: 715). Our study aims to explain the causal processes leading up to the Member 
States‟ widely spread discontent with the way "Social Europe" has developed, and the role of the 
ECJ in this process.  
 
Usually, historical institutionalist studies conduct comparative research. However, as we do not 
introduce a universal theory or claim that the causal processes we identify are applicable to other 
studies, and as a way of making sure that micro-level elements are not missed, the comparative 
research strategy has been deselected.  
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3.2 Process tracing 
The chosen method for our study, process tracing, complements the historical institutionalist 
approach, as it examines the reasons for the outcome of a case through dependent and independent 
variables. It identifies relevant factors and theoretical causal mechanisms centred around the 
specific case.  
 
In our study, the development and role of the ECJ‟s jurisprudence and the procedural rules for 
decision-making in the Council is the main focus. The increasing dissatisfaction towards social 
benefits to moving citizens among Member States is seen as a result of multiple institutions that are 
embedded in, and affected by, a historical development in the EU. Thereby, process tracing is 
suitable, as it examines how an independent variable influences a dependent variable through a 
causal chain, which can explain the connection between variables (Beach & Pedersen, 2012: 235).  
 
The examination of this connection is based on certain expectations, which are operationalized in 
the project report in the form of hypotheses. Process tracing is especially suitable for case studies, 
which is used in the project report, as it systematically examines the overall causal process, using 
cases as empirical evidence. It is important to note that process tracing examines whether and how, 
but not the extent to which the dependent variable is affected (Beach & Pedersen, 2012: 236f). It 
examines smaller parts of a case in relation to a specific outcome through causal mechanisms and a 
causal chain. Process tracing includes three approaches; the theory-testing, theory-building and the 
case-centric approach of which the latter is applied to our study.  
 
As we aim to explain the outcome of this case, with no intentions of theorizing it, the case-centric 
approach is most relevant to the project report. In the case-centric approach, it is explained how a 
specific outcome of a case has developed. Therefore, the process and the reasons for this 
development are examined in order to find an adequate explanation in which all relevant aspects of 
the case are included. However, the case-centric approach is only useful, when explaining a single 
case, and cannot explain more general aspects (Beach & Pedersen, 2012: 239). Therefore we partly 
diverge from the traditional use of the process tracing theory, as we apply it within the context of 
historical institutionalism.  
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The historical institutionalist approach and the method of process tracing are highly compatible, due 
to their common focus on causality and processes. They both focus on the development of a 
situation. However, historical institutionalism is, perhaps, more attentive to the sequences of events 
in the broader context in which the process occurs, while process tracing considers the relation 
between variables, and how outcomes are influenced by these. The combination of the two allows 
us to examine the relation between factors as well as how a certain outcome of a case was created, 
whilst also considering the importance of history and social processes. 
 
3.3 Document analysis 
The empirical data used to identify causal chains which affects the outcome of our specific case, is 
mainly based on documents. The following section will explain how document analysis is applied 
to this project report, based on the method of analyzing documents described by Lynggaard (2010). 
One distinction must be clear; Lynggaard (2010) focuses on how the use of document analysis can 
help identify how ideas transform over time. This is not the objective of this study. However, the 
research method on how to identify relevant actors and documents is still suitable for this project in 
respect to the importance of valid selection criteria when examining a broad field. The methods, and 
the applicability of these, are described in the following.  
 
3.3.1 Identifying relevant documents by the method of backwards-mapping 
The identification of actors and documents that are relevant for this project report is done by using 
an altered method of what Lynggaard refers to as „backwards-mapping‟. Although backwards-
mapping have traditionally been used to map networks of actors, it is also useful to identify relevant 
documents (Lynggaard, 2010: 225). Hence, both relevant actors and documents are to be identified 
by using this method. When using the method of backwards-mapping, one needs to take point of 
departure in at least one document. One should trace references from document to document until 
no new aspects, actors or documents of the area in question are shown. In practice, it is up to the 
researcher to determine when the point of no new discovery is reached (Lynggaard, 2010: 226). 
 
As one of the objectives of this study is to follow up on the applicability of a selection of the causal 
processes identified by Leibfried & Pierson (1995), parts of their work will serve as the starting 
point for the backwards-mapping process. Leibfried and Pierson provide an idea of which actors 
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that are relevant to include in the study of the development of social policy within the EU. Having 
selected which actors to pay attention to, the process of finding relevant documents can begin. In 
order to provide an understanding of how this process is conducted, it will be applied in the context 
of our study in the following. 
 
After having identified the ECJ as an important agent in the integration process on the area of social 
policy, some of the documents published by the ECJ were selected, such as ECJ rulings. As our 
study examines two causal processes, albeit arising from the same outcome, and their influence on 
each other, the selection criteria are dealt with separately. In order to explore the jurisprudence and 
practices of the ECJ, the cases are selected on the criteria that they either established new practices 
or interpretations, or set the precedent for a particular interpretation. For the purpose of identifying 
the development in the procedural rules for decision-making in the Council, treaties are examined in 
the historical context. These can also provide a general image of the role of social policy in the 
history of the EU and the context in which various attitudes emerged. Additionally, as all EU 
decisions are grounded in treaty articles, the reasoning for focusing on these is the aim of 
establishing a link between the judicial and political development.  
 
In this manner, the process continues until the point of no new discovery is reached. As the method 
of backwards-mapping is used to find relevant documents, the archives of documents can easily 
increase, due to the broad research field of this project. Therefore criteria for the relevance of 
documents must be defined in order to exclude irrelevant documents. In relation to the project 
report, relevant documents are identified through limitations of policy area and actors. In terms of 
policy area, it is limited to social policy related to national welfare benefits. The project report is 
limited from including e.g. national state institutions and politics. The considerations for these 
limitations are described in the section Delimitation (1.6).   
 
3.4 Reasoning behind Key Events 
In this section, the considerations for some of the selected events and documents will be outlined, as 
well as the reasons for deselecting other potentially relevant aspects. These reflections are an 
important part of the process tracing method, as they are a way of increasing the validity in the 
selection of key events.  
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3.4.1 The Treaties 
The treaties can provide a general overview of the development in the institutional settings under 
which social policy is enacted. In the theoretical framework of path dependence and historical 
institutionalism, this development will contribute to an understanding of the path of European social 
policy. Furthermore, they show the development of the procedural rules for decision-making in the 
Council and the division of competences. Our focus lies particularly with two treaties; the Treaty of 
Rome, which came into force in 1957, as it introduced the freedom of movement and the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality simultaneously, and the Maastricht Treaty, 
as it introduced the Union Citizenship.   
3.4.2 ECJ Rulings 
While rulings by the ECJ cannot be considered a single key event because it has happened 
repeatedly over a long period of time, the ECJ rulings play a crucial role in the development of this 
policy area, as a part of the ongoing process. This is due to the fact that the ECJ decides if Member 
States are violating the acquis communautaire of the Union. This has happened in many instances 
in relation to social policy and social benefits. Therefore, some of the most important ECJ rulings 
on this matter will be involved in the analysis in order to better define the path of European 
integration in regards to social policy.  
 
3.4.3 The Enlargements of 2004 and 2007 
The Eastern enlargement in 2004, and to a lesser extend the enlargement in 2007, was very 
influential to the EU, as it was the greatest expansion of the Union ever completed. With 12 new 
countries joining the existing 15 Member States, the population of the EU was increased with 
approximately 20 % (European Union, 2007)
1
. This posed new difficulties for the EU, both of a 
cooperational nature, as the number of Member States involved in the policy making process would 
be nearly twice as large as before, and on an integration level because the new states joining had 
different social and economic systems in place. It was deemed necessary to impose restrictions on 
the free movement of citizens on most of the Member States, in order to make sure that there would 
not be disturbances to the labour markets of the old Member States. These transitional restrictions 
expired in 2011 and 2014.  
 
                                                 
1
 Based on calculations on data from the source 
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3.4.4 Eurozone crisis  
The Eurozone crisis, which began in 2008, can be considered a key event in this project report. It 
caused an increased attentiveness to the economic state of the EU. This attentiveness made the 
Member States more aware of the problems that could arise from the free movement. As the end of 
the transitional restrictions coincided with the Eurozone crisis, these events should be subject to 
examination. The criteria, when viewed in a theoretical framework, can be argued for by the 
emphasis placed on the timing and sequence of events. This makes the Eurozone crisis an 
influential factor in the understanding of the Member States‟ dissatisfaction with the current 
situation within the area of social policy. 
 
3.4.5 Key Events Excluded from the Project Report 
Some events, which could be defined as key events for the EU in general, are not included as cases 
in this project report because they presumably did not change much directly within the social policy 
area. An example of this is the implementation of the EMU and the Euro as a common currency, 
which are significant events of the EU. However, these had little direct and obvious effect on 
European social policy, which is why it is not examined in this project report‟s analysis. Thus, only 
events relevant to the development of European social policy are included. 
 
3.5 Source Criticism 
This project report‟s empirical data is based on multiple sources, such as ECJ cases, textbooks, 
journal articles and research papers. It is important to be critical towards the different types of 
sources and senders, as these can be biased. The following section illustrates the use of sources 
throughout this project report. In practice, we reflect on the sources continually if they are deemed 
to be biased. However, empirical material used in this project report primarily consists of official 
documents of the EU, research papers, journal articles or books written by recognized experts on 
the studied areas.  
 
The analysis takes its point of departure in the book “European Social Policy – Between 
Fragmentation and Integration” (Leibfried & Pierson 1995). It is written by professors in political 
science with knowledge in areas such as the welfare state and social policies. Therefore, a great 
extent of legitimacy can be attached to the authors. The book is published in 1995, which usually 
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means that one should be careful in relation to the contemporaneity of the source. However, this 
source is used to describe the development of social policy at that time, which our project report 
will examine further. We have chosen to build on some of their conclusions by examining some of 
the causal processes identified that are not elaborated much on by Leibfried and Pierson (1995), as 
is the case with the ECJ‟s role in the development of a European social policy.  
A large part of the source material is legal papers in relation to court cases. These sources are 
delivered by the European Court of Justice, which attaches a great extent of legitimacy to these. As 
these legal papers generally refer to the actions and deliberations taken by the ECJ, there will be no 
reason to doubt the objectivity of these. 
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4. Leibfried & Pierson (1995): European Social 
Policy 
 
 
4.1 European Social Policy - Between Fragmentation and Integration 
As our study aims to further examine some of the key points in Leibfried & Pierson (1995), it is 
important to observe these in their rightful context, which will be outlined in this section.  
 
The work of Stephan Leibfried & Paul Pierson serves as a source of inspiration for our research 
method and theoretical framework. The book examines the relationship and interplay between EU 
organizations and the Member States on multiple subdivisions of social policy. Although they do 
not explicitly consider neither methodology nor theory, it is clear that their approach is historical 
institutionalism; they pay attention to the interplay between multiple institutions, while deducing 
causal processes and taking into consideration the economic, social and political environment and 
historical context of the issues in question (Pierson & Skocpol 2002: 697). These features are all 
common for the otherwise fragmented historical institutionalist approach. 
 
In the first chapter, they establish the EU as a “multitiered system of governance” (Pierson & 
Leibfried 1995a: 3) by identifying the powers and limits of powers of the Member States, 
comparing these with intergovernmental and federal systems of governance. The following chapter 
examines the dynamics of this type of governance in the integration of the social policy area. 
Leibfried and Pierson provide a solid groundwork for the subsequent chapters of the book by using 
the historical institutionalist approach through the application of “substantive agendas, temporal 
arguments and attention to contexts and configurations” (Pierson & Skocpol 2002: 696). The 
following chapters, being papers that are authored by various other researchers and scholars, 
examine a variety of areas of the European social policy. These chapters are not considered in our 
study as such, as we instead focus on the last chapter by Leibfried & Pierson, which draws on the 
research from these in making general conclusions on the dynamics of social policy integration.  
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4.1.1 Key Points 
In the following section, the main findings from Leibfried & Pierson (1995) are discussed in 
relation to our study and to the development that has taken place since their research.  
 
In the first chapter, they point to three features of a multi-tiered system: The role of the constituent 
units, the transformation of organized interests, and the dilemmas associated with shared policy-
making institutions. These features are then brought up conclusively in relation to the other papers 
in the book in order to identify the patterns and focal points of the political conflicts, and finally an 
overall view of the state of Europe's social dimension is outlined (Pierson & Leibfried, 1995b: 433).  
 
The way in which the EU was created has significant effects on the Member States' scope for 
action. The EU was created by the Member States as a means of solving problems collectively. As a 
consequence of the efforts to make it effective and safe from overturns of design by possible future 
governments, the EU organizations were granted a considerable amount of authority (Pierson & 
Leibfried, 1995b: 435). Subsequently, the EU organizations have always sought to maximize their 
authority, and the Commission in particular has been successful in advancing the social dimension 
(Pierson & Leibfried, 1995b: 435f). The Commission has good conditions for influencing the 
regulatory parts of social policy-making, as the low-profile, regulatory environment makes it 
possible for the Commission to work closely with experts in creating complex pieces of legislation. 
Thus it has been "well positioned to advance its own agendas in such a policy environment" 
(Pierson & Leibfried, 1995b: 437).  
 
Furthermore, the ECJ has a crucial role in the development of European social policy and the 
expansion of EU authority. Their effort in regards to scrutinizing national legislation and 
teleological, expansive interpretations of EU law has taken place in the "dark side" of the social 
policy development. The scope of their actions is considerable and has resulted in a multi-tiered, 
shared form of social policy (Pierson & Leibfried, 1995b: 456).  
 
Even though that the Commission and the ECJ has a great extent of power, the Member States still 
have a considerable amount of power via the Council. However, they are no longer in complete 
control because of the integrationist behaviour of these two organizations. The difficult process of 
taking back authority, which normally requires unanimous votes, contributes to this development. 
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Thus, it is difficult to roll back legislation "(...) even if such efforts begin to unexpectedly impinge 
on member-state sovereignty" (Pierson & Leibfried, 1995b: 439). This is related to the connection 
between the acquis communautaire and the scope of actions; when the acquis communautaire 
grows, the political scope for action narrows, due to the increasing amount of established 
legislation. This mechanism is also known as a joint-decision trap.  
 
This widening of European policy areas has led to issues of density with considerable 
consequences. Scarcity of information, time constraints, and the need for expertise makes the 
Member States prone to agreeing on legislation with unknown consequences. This is a part of the 
reason that the ECJ, through an increasingly comprehensive case-load, has been able to expand its 
own authority. Another process, which issue density triggers, is that of functional spillover; a 
process that is also related to ECJ rulings in that many court cases related to the internal market has 
far-reaching implications for the sovereignty of national welfare states (Pierson & Leibfried, 1995b: 
440f).  
 
4.1.2 Dilemmas of shared policy-making 
The multi-tiered type of governance, that characterizes the EU, causes certain dilemmas, which in 
return impacts the preferences and power of Member States and other actors.  
 
The patterns of policy-making that is identified are highly influenced by lowest-common-
denominator agreements, due to the voting systems in the decision-making process. The long 
tradition for unanimity and the Member States' veto power has created an institutional setting that 
sets the stage for compromises. It is clear that areas in which the QMV are applied enjoy much 
greater activity. Hence the "treaty-base game" has emerged, where the Commission stretches the 
interpretation in order to minimize the authority of Member States in a given policy-making 
situation (Rhodes, 1995: 86). However, even if the QMV system applies, coalitions consisting of 
few Member States with heavy votes can create obstructions. These conditions contribute to the 
creation of an institutional setting where it is easier to block decision-making than to enact policies 
(Pierson & Leibfried, 1995b: 461).  
 
These constraints to the policy-making agenda of integrationist actors lead to a search for escape 
routes. These routes have primarily led to the ECJ whereby:  
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"(...) various actors have actively sought such a development, including 
entrepreneurial members of the Court, allies within the court system of member 
states, and Commission officials who view Court action as a useful lever for 
expanding the scope of their own activities" (Pierson & Leibfried, 1995b: 461).  
 
The Court does not function as a base for positive integration. However, the Court's role in the 
development of the social policy has been paramount, but does not attract much public or scholarly 
attention as the Court does not dictate per se; it merely determines the range of options for the 
Member States (Pierson & Leibfried, 1995b: 462).  
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Analysis 
 
 
5. Early development of European Social Policy & 
the ECJ (I) 
 
 
5.1 The initiation of European social policy 
The European Union's social policy area has a long history, which goes back to the Treaty of Rome 
in 1957 and is continuously developing. The following section provides an overview of the 
development of the social policy from the Treaty of Rome to the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. This 
is done in order to outline the ideas behind the treaties and the institutional design, as these treaties 
serves as institutional framework for the development and integration process of the European 
social policy. This analysis is based on the following hypothesis;  
 
The development of a common European economic policy necessitated the 
establishment of a European social policy, but due to lack of political willpower, 
the ECJ became the leading integrative force. 
 
Social policy did not play a major role in the early development of the EU. At this time, the main 
objective was economic integration, as a measure by which one would ensure peace and stability 
among the founding Member States (The European Union, N.d. b). The idea was that people, goods 
and capital would move freely in a common market, creating interdependence and economic 
prosperity. In order for this common market to function, workers attained the right to free 
movement (Articles 48-51 EEC Treaty). The development of the common market would ensure a 
harmonization for the standard of living for workers, as well as working conditions, as described in 
Article 117 EEC Treaty. It included provisions establishing an objective for the Commission to 
encourage close cooperation in the social field (Article 118 EEC Treaty), and provisions for the 
establishment of the European Social Fund (ESF). The ESF should increase geographical and 
occupational mobility and improve employment opportunities (Kleinman, 2002: 84). Furthermore, 
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the Treaty specifically prohibited discrimination on grounds of nationality (Article 7 EEC Treaty). 
Thus, the opportunity for the EU to play a role in the social policy area was established in the 
Treaty of Rome, as it introduced some provisions for integration of some social policies.  
 
The expanding role for the EU and the sovereignty of nation states was not seen as conflicting. The 
social policy was mainly thought of as either beneficial consequences of the economic integration, 
or a necessary condition for the economic project to function (Kleinman, 2002: 82). This idea of 
economic integration as a driving force for better work and living condition builds on the 
assumption that welfare follows from economic growth. Thus, the economic integration would 
naturally spillover to the social policy area, and welfare would not stem from redistributive policies 
(Kleinman, 2002: 83f; Falkner, 2013: 269).  
 
As for secondary law, it was already established in 1958 by Regulation No. 3
2
, that there should be 
some coordination on the social security systems, so that workers would not be held back 
financially if they moved to another Member State to work. An important distinction to make in this 
regard is the difference between social security, which has been a complementary policy to the free 
movement of workers since the early years, and social assistance, which is closely linked to the 
welfare states. Hence, the social role of the EU was both limited and secondary to the aims of 
economic integration (Kleinman 2002: 84), and the social policy competences remained mainly a 
national affair (Falkner, 2013: 269).  
 
The “subsidiarity competence” provision, based in Article 100 EEC Treaty, allowed for some 
interference in particular aspects of the social dimension, if it was deemed necessary for market 
integration (Falkner, 2013: 270). This enabled the Council, by unanimity, to approximate legislation 
in Member states on grounds of a Commission proposal, if it “directly affected the establishment or 
functioning of the common market” (Falkner, 2013: 270). Additionally, Article 235 EEC Treaty 
allows for the Council to take appropriate measures in areas with no specific provisions, if 
necessary for the functioning of the common market by unanimous voting. These provisions based 
on unanimous voting provided an opportunity for harmonization of social policy during the 1970s 
and onwards (Falkner, 2013: 270).  
 
                                                 
2
 This Regulation was amended in 1971 and renamed Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71. It was reformed in Regulation 
883/2004, adopted by the Council in 2004. 
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Thus, the provisions provided a framework within which functional spillover could occur, where 
economic policy considerations necessitated a more common European approach to social policy. 
However, as the unanimous voting provides veto powers for the Member States, agreements were 
hard to reach, and when finally reached, it was difficult to exit agreements - which could lead to 
joint-decision traps. In this period, it was difficult for the Union to agree on new legislation in the 
social policy area, and thereby became trapped in the joint-decision (Falkner, 2013: 270). However, 
at the same time, a different development took place in the European Court of Justice.  
 
5.2 ECJ: Supremacy  
The supremacy of EU law is, naturally, both connected to the transfer and division of competences, 
but also in a way connected to the principle of direct effect. The supremacy of EU law was first 
explicitly established by the ECJ in 1964, in the Case 6/64 Costa, although it was implicitly held in 
Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos, where the Court held that:  
 
"The European Economic Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the 
benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit in limited fields, and the 
subjects of which compromise not only the Member States, but also their nationals" (Van Gend en 
Loos).  
 
Thereby, the Court explicitly established that individuals could bring legal action against the 
Member States, introducing the principle of direct effect, whilst implicitly introducing the concept 
of supremacy of EU law. The logic underlying this argument would be that without supremacy of 
EU law, the concept of direct effect would be meaningless. Two years later, in 1964, the ECJ built 
on the argument that the Member States had willingly limited their own sovereignty and transferred 
powers to a Community, creating "a body of law to bind their nationals and themselves" (Costa).  
 
Supremacy had no legal basis in the Treaties as such, but the ECJ argued that it was a necessary 
measure to obtain the objectives stated in some of the general provisions of the EEC Treaty, i.e. the 
requirement to ensure the attainment of the objectives, as expressed in the former Article 5 EEC 
(now Article 4(3) TEU). The ECJ has even held primary law of the EU supreme over national 
constitutional law, due to its nature as an independent source of law (Case 106/77 Simmenthal). One 
could argue that the supremacy of EU law in itself was initially the result of an interpretation of the 
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provisions of the Treaties. Based on the theoretical assumption that actors are utility-maximizing, 
the gradual acquisition of supremacy is considered only natural, as a way for the ECJ to increase 
their own power.  
 
In this regard, it is important to note that the incentives for the ECJ to act is strengthened, when the 
Council is unable to, which, as described, was largely the case in this time period. This particular 
correlation is deduced from the work of Leibfried & Pierson (1995), who argue that the Court has 
often “(...) taken an expansive view of its own role and that of the EU in social policy. European 
integration is to a large extent about “unification through law” (Pierson & Leibfried, 1995a: 11). 
Furthermore, the ECJ is not constrained by public pressures, as the judges enjoy secrecy in both 
voting results and views. As a consequence of this, the ECJ would, in theory, as a rational actor 
given a substantial amount of authority, seek to maximize its power and expand EU competences. 
In order to determine whether that is the case, one must first establish the predominant informal 
institutions - the jurisprudence - that serves as guidelines to ECJ.  
 
5. 2.1 ECJ and the teleological approach  
According to former Advocate General Nial Fennelly (1996), the ECJ typically looks to the relevant 
Treaty Articles, sometimes taking into consideration declarations or legislation from Member States 
or EU organizations. It frequently looks to draft legislation, including that which has not been 
adopted (Fennelly, 1996: 666). Furthermore, a comparative method is often used in collaboration 
with the teleological approach, so as to make sure that the Member States' common law will 
generally support the interpretation and that the context is considered. Thereby it would seem that 
the Court in fact does not automatically seek to maximize its power, as there is a particular 
jurisprudence that makes room for the Member States' preferences to interfere. 
 
The interpretative methods used by the ECJ have been referred to as a "teleological approach". The 
Court itself, however, rarely refers to their method of interpreting in that wording. The first time 
that the Court explicitly mentioned its way of interpretation was in 1962, in the Case 26/62 Van 
Gend en Loos, where it stated that: "(...) it is necessary to consider the spirit, the general scheme 
and the wording of the provision" (Van Gend en Loos). The judicial creativity that goes along with 
the teleological approach to interpretation of law is not in itself necessarily a source of critique. As 
Professor in Comparative Public Law Oreste Pollicino (2004) argues from a legalist perspective, it 
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is in fact a necessity due to two factors; the vague wordings in the Treaties, and the institutional 
design of the EU. The vague wording can be seen as a result of disagreements between the different 
Member States. As for the institutional design, he argues that the requirement of unanimity has 
created legislative inertia and voids that, as a consequence, it has been filled by the ECJ (Pollicino, 
2004: 286).  
 
5.2.2 ECJ as Precedent-Setting 
Even though there is no formal system of precedent in place regarding ECJ rulings, a system has 
been developed over time, where the ECJ can and often do refer to former cases, or even outright 
expect national courts to follow earlier ECJ rulings if there is a previous ruling regarding the same 
question. This informal system of precedent was first recognized in the Case 28-30/62 Da Costa. 
The ECJ decided in this case that ”(...) references need not be made to the Court of Justice where 
the materially identical question had already been answered by the Court of Justice - in that 
instance, in the „Van Gend en Loos‟ case heard shortly before" (Foster, 2012: 63).  
 
Since then, the ECJ has utilized the instrument of precedent with case law several times. In the 
context of the vague wordings and consequently teleological interpretation, the system of precedent 
is particularly important, as the interpretative approach both establishes guidelines for the national 
courts to follow but also makes room for alternative interpretations by the ECJ alongside a changing 
historical and political setting. In the Case 43/75 Defrenne, it was determined that the Union, along 
with the previously established economic aims, also had social objectives. Also the much later Case 
85/96 Sala had a great impact in this regard, as the ECJ effectively changed the Union citizenship 
and the following rights of free movement and the receiving of social benefits, from only being of 
relevance to economically active persons, such as workers, to be a universally applicable right. This 
precedent was followed in a number of cases such as Case 184/99 Grzelczyk and Case 224/98 
D‟Hoop. The Sala and Grzelczyk cases are covered more extensively in Judicial Implications of the 
Citizenship 6.3. Precedent has thusly become an important instrument in case law for the ECJ. Both 
in encouraging Member States to integrate European social policy into national law, and in shaping 
and developing European social policy, by to some extent working around Member States and the 
Council.  
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Interestingly, the infringement procedure was hardly used before the 1980's (Sweet & Kelemen, 
2013: 9). However, as the ECJ had already established its supremacy and direct effects and thereby 
opened up for individuals to litigate under EU law, the preliminary procedure would subsequently 
lead to a wave of allegations towards Member States, providing positive feedback for the informal 
institutions of the ECJ. As rational actors, anyone with an interest in a particular interpretation of 
the law would try to push the interpretation in a direction most suitable for their own agendas. This 
informal institutional design would thereby ensure the flow of incoming cases and meet the first 
condition for the process of judicialization. The positive feedback mechanisms, which reinforced 
the use of a teleological approach, ensured the second condition of the judicialization process; the 
establishing of a coherent case-law. Lastly, the informal system of precedent can be seen as a 
fulfilment of the third condition, the acknowledgement from legal subjects and referral in future 
decision-making, as exemplified in Da Costa.  
 
5.3 The Development of Social Policy in the 1970’s 
In 1974, a resolution from the Council on a Social Action Program (SAP) showed a growing 
political commitment to social legislation. The resolution “(...) noted that economic expansion was 
not to be seen as an end itself but should result in an improvement of the quality of life” (Hantrais, 
1995:5). This social awareness originated from uneven growth within the EU and from the effect of 
the common market itself (Kleinman, 2002: 85). Thus it can be considered an early sign of a 
functional spillover process deriving from the common market. The SAP intended to reach beyond 
the basic social policy implications given in the Treaty of Rome (Geyer, 2000: 36). However, the 
economic incentives were stressed, as it was important not to violate Member State sovereignty. 
This can be considered a foreshadowing of the later use of the principle of subsidiarity, as they did 
not wish to interfere in the national policy domains in a direct manner (Kleinman, 2002: 85).  
 
Furthermore, the SAP covered the general working conditions (Falkner, 2013: 273), and did not 
operationalize a development of the rights for moving workers in particular. The Commission 
wished to develop policy through this programme rather than through judicial action, but a period of 
stagnation evolved after the extensive currency fluctuations in the early 1970‟s, and the programme 
produced mixed and limited results (Geyer, 2000: 36f). Thus, it did not succeed to make progress 
through political judgment and positive integration, due to the economic crisis of the 1970‟s.  
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Therefore, the social policy area was difficult to integrate positively, leading to a predominant 
negative integration by the ECJ‟s removal of barriers for further social integration. A case which 
occurred shortly after the SAP was the Case 43/75 Defrenne, which was the first case ruled, albeit 
only partly, on the basis of recognition of the social progress as an objective of the Union through 
rulings (Pollicino, 2004: 296). The case concerns a stewardess being paid less than her male 
counterparts, while doing the same amount of work. Although not related to moving workers‟ rights 
as such, it was remarkable because equal rights and the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality in the context of the EU, had previously only been based in economic integration. The 
ECJ interpreted, despite objections from the UK and Irish governments, that Article 119 EEC 
Treaty would give rise to horizontal direct effects even though it was, according to Pollicino (2004: 
294f), clearly referring to the Member States.  
 
The reasoning of the ECJ was found in i.e. the preamble to the Treaty, providing a general aim to 
improve the working and living conditions of the people. This was the first time, out of many more 
to come, that the Court brought up the social objectives of the EU (Pollicino, 2004: 296). This case 
reflects the ECJ‟s autonomy in their judgments, as it does not necessarily take account of the wishes 
of the Member States, but rather the objectives of the Union. Furthermore, it illustrates how the ECJ 
constitutionalize the Treaties, and thereby strengthens their own authority. Despite of almost no 
explicit social policy competences in the Treaty of Rome, some room for manoeuvre was provided 
through an extensive interpretation of the Treaty Articles. In a historical institutionalist perspective, 
where timing and sequence are considered important for the impact of events, it is arguable that this 
particular sequence of events induced a positive feedback process for the jurisprudence of the ECJ. 
Institutional constraints and the lack of political homogeneity allowed the ECJ to attain 
considerable power. 
 
The claim of Leibfried and Pierson (1995), that various integrationist actors have sought influence 
through the ECJ, can be supported by the measure used by the ECJ to rely on Commission draft 
legislation that has not yet been approved by the Council. Furthermore, a former judge of the ECJ, 
Constantinos Kakouris, states that: "The Court sometimes dismisses the rule of the common 
denominator and adopts the rule most conducive to the ultimate objective of Community 
integration" (Kakouris, 1994: 274). The practice of ensuring that the objectives of the Community 
outweigh the interests of the Member States is supported by the corollary of effet utile, directly 
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translated effectiveness of the legislation. This doctrine leads the Court to sometimes twist or 
disregard literal meanings, in order to make sure that the provision retains effectiveness (Fennelly, 
1996: 674).  
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the ECJ began interpreting some of the provisions of Regulation 1408/71
3
 
so extensively that the Member States objected to the rulings. The Court argued that some of the 
national benefits would fall within both social assistance and social security and thereby considered 
them to belong to the latter. This was deeply contested by Member States, who claimed that the ECJ 
had overstepped its boundaries and that “(...) the relevant social assistance kind of benefits fell 
outside the spirit and purpose of the Treaties” (Martinsen & Falkner, 2010: 13).  
 
These objections, along with the protection of the national authority on the social assistance through 
unanimous vote, illustrates that there was a limit to the Member States‟ tolerance towards ECJ‟s 
judicial creativity; when it infringed national sovereignty, and particularly in this national 
redistributive social policy area, there would be consequences. In 1992, the Council of Ministers 
was dissatisfied with the ECJ‟s expansive interpretation of social assistance, and managed to 
overrule it through the amendment of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 to Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 1247/92. The regulation specified that “certain benefits with characteristics between social 
security and social assistance should be made non-exportable to hosting member states” 
(Martinsen & Falkner, 2011: 13). Thus specifying some benefits, which are exportable and some 
which are exclusively in the country of residence. This aimed to keep the ECJ from such an extent 
of expansive interpretation, especially considered that it is in the protectionist area of national 
welfare states. The overruling of the ECJ‟s interpretation is a rare action, but it illustrates 
conflicting objectives between the Member States, seeking to protect their welfare states, and the 
ECJ, seeking to foster more integration. Also, this can be considered a pressure to change the path 
of the ECJ and therefore, negative feedback. 
 
The ECJ seemed to consider the correction by the Council of Ministers, which is reflected in the 
cases C-20/96 Snares and C-297/96 Partridge (Martinsen & Falkner, 2011: 14) regarding social 
security of migrant workers, which apply to the latter Regulation. However, as considered by 
Leibfried & Pierson, the institutions can develop their own interests, which they aim to promote 
                                                 
3
 The amended version of Regulation No. 3 of 1958 
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independently of the Member States (Pierson & Leibfried, 1995b: 434). In this case, it can be 
argued that the ECJ, as well as the Commission, promoted their own agenda in relation to 
integration. Even though the ECJ followed the correction for some time, the Commission managed 
to push through the expansive interpretation by the ECJ politically, as it was dissatisfied with the 
Council Regulation (Martinsen & Falkner, 2011: 15). Therefore, the institutions can be considered 
self-reinforcing. Furthermore, this might be a judicialization of politics, as the ECJ influences the 
Member States.  
 
The practices of interpretation by the ECJ can be considered to comply with the conditions of 
judicialization, as it has attained positive feedback by the Commission, established coherent case 
law within the area of social policy, and received acknowledgement from legal subjects. This case 
illustrates the judicialization of politics, as the agenda of the ECJ is attained politically despite of 
resistance from the Member States. 
 
5.4 The Single European Act 
In relation to the further development of treaties, the first major revision of the Treaty of Rome 
came with the Single European Act (SEA) entering into force in 1987. Its main objectives were the 
completion of the Single European Market including the free movement of goods, services, labour 
and capital. As was also the case in the Treaty of Rome, social policy was not a major concern of 
the SEA. QMV was introduced on decisions concerning health and safety of workers through the 
amendment of Article 118 EEC Treaty, although not for measures concerning free movement of 
persons or the rights and interests of employed persons. Additionally, a new section was added in 
Article 130a-e to strengthen economic and social cohesion, through better coordination of the 
structural funds (Kleinman, 2002: 87; Hantrais, 1995: 7f). The social aspects of the SEA were, 
however, still closely linked to the market-making objectives of the SEA and can be seen as a 
“selective political spillover” (Kleinman 2002: 87); a deliberate political choice grounded in a 
functional spillover process.  
 
Although not many initiatives were commenced in relation to free movement of persons, a general 
willingness to integration might be considered through the 1989 Community Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, better known as the Social Charter, as well as the following 
Social Action Programme, which was signed by all Member States except the UK. The Social 
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Charter referred to workers‟ rights, but it was not a legally binding document; merely a solemn 
declaration. However, most of the measures from the 1989 SAP was blocked in the Council by 
Britain, and only two relatively minor measures had been adopted until 1991 (Kleinman, 2002: 88). 
Other Member States than the UK were reluctant as well, but gave support to social legislation 
being aware that Britain would use its veto (ibid). 
 
5.5 Interim conclusion 
It can be concluded that the social policy area was not considered to a greater extent before the 
Maastricht Treaty. It was mainly related to the Common Market, and can be explained as a part of a 
functional spillover process from the policies in this area. The assumption behind the Treaty of 
Rome that economic integration as possibly leading to better working conditions can illustrate the 
close relation to the market.  
 
Despite this close link and some actions taken in relation to social policy, the effects of positive 
integration were rather marginal, and thus the ECJ was allowed influence through negative 
integration. As a result of the transfer of sovereignty to the EU organizations, the ECJ has gained a 
considerable scope of action and has sought to maximize its competences by interpreting the 
Treaties, and constitutionalizing the objectives of the EU. Although there have been some 
objections to the interpretative practice in the ECJ, it has been predominantly successful in this, as 
the process has been largely unnoticed. One could argue that the timing were right, as the EU was 
relatively fragile and lacked political consensus to act as a strong integrative force. Thereby, the 
process of constitutionalization by the ECJ, through their ability to declare supremacy of EU law 
and interpret the Treaties widely, exemplifies a positive feedback process, reinforcing the ECJ as an 
institution.  
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6. The Establishment of Union Citizenship (II) 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The following analysis examines the establishment of Union Citizenship, as well as the 
development in social policy until the enlargement. Firstly, it examines the Treaty on the European 
Union (TEU), henceforth referred to as the Treaty of Maastricht, in which citizenship is established. 
Secondly, it examines the Treaty of Amsterdam in which the first social chapter is introduced. 
Thirdly, it examines the role of the ECJ in judicialization of politics and in interpreting Union 
Citizenship. Lastly, the Treaty of Nice is assessed. This is examined on the basis of the following 
hypothesis;  
 
Although the introduction of a Union citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty was 
largely symbolic, the ECJ used the vague wording to interpret the provision in a 
way that restricted the Member States‟ autonomy. 
 
The Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 1993, and allowed for further political integration. This 
included the establishment of a common Union citizenship, the right to reside in all Member States, 
as well as a Social Protocol. In the negotiations of the Maastricht treaty, the UK was strongly 
against the inclusion of the so-called „Social Chapter‟ in the Treaty. This led to a British opt-out 
from the provision of the measures agreed by the rest of the Member States. The result was the 
creation of a separate Agreement on Social Policy, also known as the Social Protocol, annexed to 
the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
This allowed for the other eleven Member States to use the institutions, procedures and mechanisms 
of the treaty to uphold the status of the Social Protocol, which was based on the 1989 Social 
Charter. Thus, after the Maastricht Treaty, the EU had two different legal bases for the adoption of 
social policy measures; The EC Treaty valid for all Member States and the Social Protocol valid for 
all Member States except the UK, who favoured a non-binding recommendation (Kleinman, 2002: 
89; Falkner, 2013: 271). The Social Protocol extended QMV in the areas of health and safety at 
work, working conditions, information and consultation of workers, equality between men and 
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women, and integration of persons excluded from the labour market (Kleinman, 2002: 89). The 
British opt-out might have led to a fragmentation of the Union, as different procedures applied. A 
harmonization of citizenship rights can be illustrated through the establishment of some common 
minimum standards, which can be seen as positive feedback, and the transaction costs of exiting the 
cooperation would increase.  
 
In general, welfare policies have traditionally been a national domain with substantial positive 
feedback for the national governments. However, the development of especially the economic 
integration, made possible a functional spillover effect to take place because an integrated common 
market with free movement of workers made it necessary to simultaneously extend the level of 
cooperation in relation to social policy.  
 
In relation to the freedom of movement, the introduction of a Union Citizenship was significant, 
although it was meant as a symbolic gesture, and was perceived as such for some time 
(Wollenschläger, 2011: 3). Through this treaty, the union citizens‟ right to reside freely in the EU, 
as well as other rights, such as the right to vote in the state of residence, was established (European 
Union, 2010a). Thus, it is established that “Every citizen who is a national of a Member State is 
also a citizen of the Union” in article 20 TFEU. However, the vague definition of Union Citizenship 
in the Treaty allowed for broad interpretations from the Court of Justice, and thus, the ECJ can 
promote their interests through this definition. This is illustrated through the cases 32/98 Sala and 
Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, which will be assessed later in this analysis. 
 
6.2 The Treaty of Amsterdam 
Prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the rights of workers were recognized in the Single 
Market in relation to the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality as described in 
Article 45 TEU. As previously assessed, this illustrates a close connection between the single 
market and social policy, as the rights of workers were introduced as a part of the single market. 
The close connection between these sections can lead to a spillover effect in which integration of 
the market spills over into the social policy area, and thus continuously leads to more integration, 
due to the increasing interdependence.  
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The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference was an opportunity for the more integrative countries to 
further develop the principle of an “ever closer Union”, as was established in the EEC Treaty, while 
the more eurosceptic countries could adjust the EU structure. The organizations believed that QMV 
should be extended and gradually replace unanimity in order to prepare the EU for enlargement 
(Phinnemore, 2013: 32). This could make it easier to reach decisions, as unanimity would no longer 
be required, and thus, it could also decrease the risk of lowest common denominator agreements, as 
mentioned in the section 4. Leibfried & Pierson (1995): European Social Policy.  
 
The Amsterdam Treaty was the first treaty to officially include a Social Chapter. Through the 
treaty, an enhanced cohesion in social policy was the objective, as the UK became a part of the 
cooperation. Through this, a greater extent of harmonization among the Member States was 
reached. Thereby, the development from the Social Protocol in the Maastricht Treaty to the Social 
Chapter in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which the UK agreed upon, illustrates a continuous 
integration, as well as a widening and a deepening of the EU integration. This might have increased 
the relative benefits and reinforced the institution through a greater extent of cooperation, thus 
causing positive feedback, and increasing the transaction costs of abandoning the cooperation. The 
political areas included in the social scope of the Treaty included “integration of persons excluded 
from the labour market”, “working conditions” and “labour force issues”, which were based on 
Articles 136-45 TFEU (The European Union, n.d. c). For the first time, the social security and 
protection of workers, as well as anti-discrimination measures, were included (Leibfried, 2010: 
258). The inclusion of this Social Chapter can be considered a spillover effect, as the integration of 
the single market and conditions for workers has spilled over into another section; social policy. 
 
Besides from the introduction of social policy to the treaties, the Treaty of Amsterdam included the 
expansion of QMV through co-decision in the adoption of directives in some areas of social policy 
(The European Union, n.d. c). However, social security coordination and similar social policy areas 
maintained the adoption through unanimity, which meant that a greater risk of joint decision-traps 
still remained in these areas. This is due to the causal relation that when agreements are reached, it 
can be difficult to change them, even if they become inefficient, as described by Fritz Scharpf. Even 
though that QMV was extended, treaties are still negotiated in intergovernmental settings. This have 
led to vague phrasings of the treaties, which allows for judicial creativity. Furthermore, the power 
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of the ECJ was expanded, as areas such as immigration was transferred to its jurisdiction (Kapsis, 
2013: 173).  
 
Thus, the Treaty of Amsterdam included the first Social Chapter in which different measures of 
non-discrimination and standards for working environment was introduced, which might be due to 
spillover from market integration, which is also previously considered. Also, the extent of QMV 
was expanded, which led to a decrease in the risk of lowest common denominator agreements, as 
well as joint-decision traps. Lastly, enhanced cooperation was introduced, which allowed for a 
multi-speed Europe and recognizes the different wishes for the level of integration.  
 
6.3 Judicial implications of Citizenship 
When exploring the judicialization of politics in the national social policy area, it is important to 
note that a substantial number of cases, that would prove to be precedent-setting, were not labelled 
"social policy" in case law. As described in the section 5.3 The Development of Social Policy in the 
1970‟s, there has been a political spillover from the concept of a free market and the freedom of 
movement, to the social policy area. This spillover process has also taken place in the judicial 
realm.  
 
The right to move and reside freely as a worker, which was initially intended as a way of securing 
the free movement of economically active persons, was in a range of court cases read by the ECJ in 
conjunction with the provisions on prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality and 
union citizenship. Through the judgments, the ECJ established what Leibfried has termed "market-
compatibility requirements" (Leibfried 2010: 255), which basically meant that national 
governments would be prohibited to design welfare systems that would put moving workers, and 
citizens as well after the introduction of Union Citizenship, at a disadvantage compared to non-
moving workers or citizens because it would hinder the free movement.  
 
In this respect, the ECJ‟s extensive interpretative measure established a very broad definition of the 
term “worker”, which set precedent for future decisions progressively (Foster, 2012: 308). As the 
definition of the term is not defined in the Treaties, the ECJ decided from the very beginning that 
the classification as "Union worker" should be defined on EU level to ensure the uniform 
interpretation of the law. This would eventually include part-time workers, those seeking work and 
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those who had previously worked in the host Member State, but was now in worker training or in a 
relevant educational course. The broad definition greatly affected the Member States' scope of 
action for limiting the grant of jobseeker's allowances.  
 
Furthermore, the introduction of Union citizenship led to a range of court cases, as some of the 
rights that were previously restricted to moving workers were now applied to moving citizens as 
well. These “crossover” cases dealt with two sets of rights; those related to the status as worker and 
those related to citizenship rights.  
 
As previously referred to, an influential ECJ ruling is the case of Sala, as it was determined for the 
first time that Union citizens are entitled to equal treatment with nationals regarding social benefits 
(Chalmers et al, 2010:454). Thereby, it provided them with the same rights as workers. This case 
concerned a Spanish national, Martinez Sala, applying for child-raising allowance from the German 
state, where she had been living for most of her life. Her request was denied by German authorities 
because she did not have a residence permit and was not a German citizen. The ECJ overturned this 
ruling, as they decided that the requirement of a residence permit was unlawful as it was 
discriminating to non-nationals, since German authorities would not have asked for an equivalent 
permit from their own citizens.  
This case is remarkable because Martinez Sala was a non-national and not economically active, but 
still attained the right to receive social benefits from a host state. Thereby, the ECJ transformed the 
Union citizenship from being strictly an economical mechanism supporting the movement of i.e. 
workers and students, to a broader tool utilized as support against discrimination of Union citizens: 
 
„Martinez Sala therefore starts the process of decoupling the acquisition of rights from the 
requirement to be economically active. The Union does not require that citizens pursue a 
professional or trade activity (...) in order to enjoy rights provided in Part Two of the EC Treaty, on 
citizenship of the Union.‟ (Quote from Steiner & Woods (2009), in Waite, 2012: 1).  
 
This went against the precedent of case law prior to Union Citizenship, as the ECJ had previously 
ruled in the Case 316/85 Lebon (1987), and since used as precedent-setting that: "(...) the benefits 
provided by legislation on free movement were only for those in actual employment and not for 
those who migrate in search of work and not find it" (Foster, 2012: 315). Thereby, they interpreted 
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the EU Citizenship provisions in conjunction with the Treaty provision on prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality. The interpretation method used in Sala was repeated in i.e. 
the Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, where it was confirmed that it was not allowed for Member States to 
set up requirements for non-nationals for the attainment of social assistance, if nationals of the 
Member State in question was not subject to these requirements (Press Release, No. 41/2001). 
Furthermore the ECJ stated that “Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of 
nationals of the Member States”, thereby establishing the significance of the citizenship. Thus, the 
ECJ uses the broad interpretations to promote further integration and freedom of movement.  
 
This also, in some ways, limited the national governments' autonomy because it restricted some of 
the options that the Member States previously had - in the case of Sala, being their autonomy to 
require some form of documentation that she was resident, or refuse to grant financial aid on the 
grounds that she was not a worker. This is also claimed by Pierson & Leibfried; that ECJ often 
limits the Member States' scope of action, as it "indicates that member states must select from a 
smaller range of options than they had available in the past" (Pierson & Leibfried, 1995b: 462) 
 
6.4 The Treaty of Nice 
In 2000, the Amsterdam Treaty was amended in the Treaty of Nice, which entered into force in 
2003. Continuing in the direction of the previous treaty, institutional reforms and handling 
enlargement remained on the agenda of the 2000 Intergovernmental Conference. The continuous 
functioning of the organizations was especially emphasized, and the “Amsterdam leftovers”, 
including votes in the Council, issues related to the Commission and the extension of QMV, should 
be managed (Phinnemore, 2013: 34). The prospect of the Treaty of Nice was to prepare the entry of 
the Eastern Countries. It was signed in 2001, only three years before the entry of the new countries 
(Phinnemore, 2013: 34f). This might relate to some changes preparing the enlargement, as well as 
some issues, which the existing Member States wished to assess before the entry of the new 
Member States. In the area of social policy, modernization of social protection systems and the 
prospect to combat social exclusion was now included under the QMV, as described in Article 
137(1) Treaty of Nice, and these aspects were the only new contributions to social policy in this 
treaty (Leibfried, 2010: 263). 
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Treaty of Nice especially amended the EU organizations, and introduced new procedural rules that 
paved the way for the upcoming enlargement. However, the more EU positive members of the 
Parliament expressed concerns on a drift towards intergovernmentalism. Even though the Nice 
Treaty did not integrate further or deepen specific policy areas as such, it merely changed the 
procedural rules so that it would be easier to make decisions, and easier to opt-out of agreements by 
the introduction of the enhanced cooperation procedure. Thereby it can be argued that the Treaty of 
Nice led the way for further deepening and widening of the EU (Phinnemore, 2013: 36).  
 
However, some considered the treaty a failure, on the grounds that it did not manage to prepare the 
EU properly for the enlargement. The treaty was criticized for being solely a treaty enabling 
enlargement, and therefore, it was argued that a need for another treaty existed (Fischer & Metz, 
2004: 5). The debate on integration following the Treaty of Nice was largely dominated by 
advocates for more integration, and the case for a European constitution was launched (Phinnemore, 
2013: 38). Therefore, the Treaty of Nice might not be considered a significant Treaty for social 
policy, but it brought some changes and prepared the EU procedurally for the enlargement. 
Moreover, it is a part of the process moving towards enlargement and the expansion of rights in 
relation to freedom of movement and social assistance.  
 
6.5 Interim Conclusion 
The Maastricht Treaty established the Union citizenship. It was, however, vaguely defined and 
meant to be a symbolic gesture illustrating the unity of the Union. This had some unintended 
consequences, as it allowed the ECJ to interpret the meaning of citizenship in the cases of Sala and 
Grzelczyk in a broad manner, and in conjunction with the provision on prohibition of discrimination 
on grounds of nationality. These cases established market-compatibility requirements, which 
restricted the Member States' autonomy. Moreover, they narrowed the Member States‟ 
opportunities to restrict non-national citizens‟ opportunities to receive benefits in the host state. 
Thus, it can be considered a spillover process, as integration has spilled over from the single market 
to the freedom of movement, and to social policy.  
 
Furthermore, the Maastricht Treaty included a Social Protocol for all the Member States except for 
the UK. In this way, some common standards could induce a harmonization of social policies. 
Through the Amsterdam Treaty, this harmonization was strengthened, as the Social Chapter of this 
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treaty included the UK. This can be considered a positive feedback process, as the relative benefits 
of remaining in the cooperation are increased, while the transaction costs of exiting the agreement 
might increase. Thus, the institution is reinforced. The process in which more areas move to QMV 
might decrease the risk of joint-decision traps and lowest common denominator agreements. 
However, the fact that treaties are based on more intergovernmental settings might cause some 
vague formulations in the treaties, which allows greater room for interpretation. The development 
after the establishment of a Union citizenship shows a further integration of social policy from a 
political aspect, but perhaps even more from a judicial aspect in which the ECJ in this time period 
reinforced its status and further institutionalized the practice of judicial creativity.  
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7. The Eastern Enlargement (III) 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The Eastern Enlargement encompasses the ten new Member States that joined the EU on May 1
st
 
2004 and the two that joined in 2007. These countries were Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004, and afterwards 
Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. This part of the analysis examines the indirect effects of this 
enlargement on European social policy regarding social benefits for non-nationals from other 
Member States, both formal, as in law passed with regards to this issue, and informal. This is to test 
the hypothesis that the old Member States (EU15) have become increasingly protectionists of their 
welfare systems because of the enlargement:  
 
The combination of the recent case law and the looming Eastern Enlargement 
caused the Member States to be more protective about national welfare systems 
and consequently the Citizenship Directive, transitional restrictions and 
regulation 883/2004 was an answer to that. 
 
It is reasonable to presume that there were several reasons, both geopolitical and economical, for 
the EU and the countries from the former East bloc to work towards the enlargement (Moravcsik & 
Vachudova, 2003: 43). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former East bloc viewed EU 
membership as both a way to boost their economies and to avoid falling entirely under Russian 
influence again. The EU15 states viewed it practically the same way; an expansion of the market 
and improved possibilities for the free movement of labour and goods would have a positive effect 
on markets. Similarly, the enlargement would hopefully help stabilize and democratize the region, 
which was also in the EU‟s geopolitical interest (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003: 46).  
 
The Member States, however, showed precaution leading up to the enlargement, which was 
demonstrated in some of the policies implemented immediately before the new Member States 
formally joined the Union. The Amsterdam Treaty and Nice Treaty both aimed at changing the 
institutional design in order to cope with the upcoming enlargement, which is elaborated in the 
section 6. The Establishment of Union citizenship. Apart from the Treaties, the most notable and 
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striking policies are the transitional restrictions and the Citizenship Directive, which are examined 
in the following sections, as well as Regulation 883/2004, which is examined in relation to the 
Citizenship Directive, as they are closely linked. 
 
7.2 The Transitional Restrictions 
The EU15 and the EU-organizations worried that the differences in wealth and wages between 
EU15 and the new Member States, with the exception of Cyprus and Malta, would result in a 
sudden influx in immigrants to the EU15 (Currie, 2008: 12f). Therefore, transitional measures were 
taken in order to forestall this, which was based on the concern that the possibility of free 
movement for CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) Member States from the beginning could possibly 
result in social dumping, welfare tourism, higher unemployment and lower wages in the EU 
(Currie, 2008: 12f).  
 
These measures are sometimes called the “2+3+2” formula because of the procedural design. It 
created an opportunity for the EU15 countries to set up restrictions on migrant workers from the ten 
CEE countries, as well as the migrant workers' access to their labour markets, initially for two 
years. After a review by the Council of Ministers, they would be able to extend the restrictions for 
three more years, and lastly it would be possible to extend again for two more years, if serious 
disturbances or the threat of some (European Commission, n.d. a). However, it is not further 
elaborated what a disturbance entails. The purpose was to ease the transition by allowing the new 
CEE Member States time to attain wages and social security at a level closer to the EU15, and 
simultaneously give the EU15 countries time to adjust and prepare their respective social systems.  
 
Initially, all the EU15 countries, with the exceptions of Great Britain, Ireland, and Sweden, imposed 
transitional restrictions towards the CEE Member States joining in 2004. Great Britain had no 
restrictions on worker influx, as they needed unskilled labour, but made it more difficult to obtain 
social benefits for migrant workers through the Workers' Registration Scheme (Currie, 2008: 35). 
When Bulgaria and Romania joined the Union in 2007, all EU15 countries, except for Sweden, 
imposed transitional restrictions. 
 
It was not the first time that transitional restrictions were imposed on ascending Member States. 
Transitional restrictions and measures were also in place when Greece, followed by Spain and 
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Portugal, joined the EU in 1981 and 1986, respectively. At that time, they were made for roughly 
the same reason as the restrictions under the Eastern enlargement, but they were lifted earlier than 
expected, when no significant movement occurred (Currie, 2008:14). This shows that restrictions of 
this kind on ascending Member States are no new invention. On the contrary, the Member States 
have acted somewhat protective of their existing social systems and labour markets for a long time, 
which also shows in i.e. the Copenhagen Criteria from 1993 in which certain conditions such as a 
free liberal market, must be established before a state is eligible as a future member of the EU. 
What is new, regarding the Eastern Enlargement, is mainly the size of the enlargement and the 
number of ascending states that are affected by these transitional restrictions.  
 
7.3 The Citizenship Directive 
Directive 2004/38/EC, more commonly known as the Citizenship Directive, was passed on April 
29th 2004, only two days before the Eastern enlargement formally took place. It is worth noting 
that, being a directive, Member States would not necessarily have to implement it until 2006. 
Among other things, this directive should elaborate on the rights granted to Union citizens in the 
Maastricht Treaty by Article 21(1) TFEU, which states that:  
 
“1. Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the 
measures adopted to give them effect.” (Article 21(1) TFEU) 
 
Similarly, it expands and elaborates on the rights of Union citizens, workers and their families for 
free movement in the Union, which was first granted by Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 decided by 
the Council of Ministers in 1968. This directive has the purpose of amending that particular 
regulation, and creates a single legislative act, instead of the numerous directives amending this 
regulation before. Thus, its subheading is; „On the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territories of the Member States‟ (Directive 
2004/38/EC)   
 
As previously stated, the Citizenship Directive was more of an attempt to collect all of the 
accumulative law regarding free movement and social benefits, which was previously scattered in 
several different directives, than an attempt to introduce actual new law. It did, however, introduce 
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some new provisions that in general liberalized the opportunities for Union citizens to move to 
other Member States, by reducing the administrative hurdles that moving citizens and their families 
would have to overcome in order to exercise the right of residence (European Union, 2009). One 
important provision that was kept from the previous directives was that citizens moving to another 
Member State were required not to be an unreasonable burden on their host state. How this should 
be assessed and determined was not in the directive, and it was implied that the Member States 
themselves could decide whether a person is a burden or not. The only remark of the directive 
regarding this assessment was that the Member States shall take into account the principle of 
proportionality and a number of factors such as age, degree of integration, family and economic 
situation.  
 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 "On the coordination of social security systems", which was passed 
the same day as the Citizenship Directive, is mostly technical and is used to define the different 
forms of social assistance, relevant to the Citizenship Directive. There are, however, a few new 
additions with relevance to the Member States‟ management of social assistance for non-nationals. 
The most distinctive of these additions include the principle of the aggregation of periods outlined 
in Article 6, as well as the distinction of social assistance with the purpose of assisting job-seekers 
in the search for a job. Article 6 states that it is possible for Union citizens to aggregate periods of 
insurance, employment, self-employment or residence in a Member State, and that this period must 
then be taken into account by a potential host state. This essentially means e.g. that if a Union 
citizen has been in employment in a Member State, it should be easier for the person to receive 
social assistance, if relevant, in a host state in which a certain period of employment is required 
before receiving benefits (European Union, 2013). Furthermore, Article 64 states that an 
unemployed person has the right to receive unemployment benefits in a host state for the first three 
months of a stay, if certain conditions are met. These conditions includes that the unemployed 
person is registered as unemployed with the competent state, and actively seeks a job in this period.  
 
7.4 ECJ and the Citizenship Directive 
Another reason for this new directive to be viewed as important to pass prior to the enlargement, 
can be found by examining ECJ rulings on social benefits prior to the directive; The most important 
of these being the Case C-85/96 Sala, which has been assessed in section 6.3 The Establishment of 
Union citizenship. This case was influential, as Union citizenship was essentially changed from 
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being largely symbolical, to an actual legal status. This change in the nature of citizenship meant 
that Union citizens, with residence in another Member State than their original, had the same rights 
to social assistance as nationals. Therefore, this judgement effectively set a precedent, which was 
upheld in the Grzelczyk case. 
 
These court rulings, along with the forthcoming enlargement, urged the EU15 to collect and update 
the existing law into the Citizenship Directive. This was due to the circumstances that the precedent 
set by the ECJ were largely considered too extensive and potentially costly for Member States, who 
would now risk having to provide social benefits to economically inactive non-nationals. Thereby, 
the link between the labour markets and the social security systems of the Member States were 
removed. The precedent set in those cases could be perceived as a possible threat against national 
welfare systems, especially with the Eastern enlargement looming. 
 
The Citizenship Directive introduced some new rules that made it possible for Member States to set 
up some requirements for non-nationals in their territory. Article 24 provides that the Member 
States do not have an obligation to provide any social assistance for the first three months of 
residence for non-nationals. Additionally, the Member States were not obliged to grant maintenance 
aid to students prior to acquisition of permanent residence, unless the person in question is a worker 
or self-employed. To some extent, this article abandoned the precedent set in place by the Sala and 
Grzelczyk rulings because the requirement of either being a worker or a permanent resident is set, 
before most forms of social assistance can be granted. Thus, the worker cannot receive social 
assistance before residing in the host state. The Member States are only obliged to grant Union 
citizens permanent residence after five years of lawful residence, according to Article 16 of the 
Citizenship Directive. Even though the Citizenship Directive made it easier for workers, their 
families and students to receive social benefits in a host country, it clarified the rules and removed 
the opportunity for citizens to receive benefits in a host state, when they did not fall into these 
categories and at the same time were not self-sufficient.  
 
The Citizenship Directive however, was not as effective at limiting the possibilities for migrants 
receiving social benefits, as the Member States could have hoped for, as later case law exhibits (see 
section 8.3 ECJ Rulings after the Implementation of the Citizen Directive). Even though the 
methods of implementing this directive is mainly left to the Member States, the ECJ has, on 
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multiple occasions, ruled against the ways in which this directive is enforced or implemented into 
national law. Similarly, the Commission published a report in 2008, in which it was assessed that 
none of the Member States had implemented the Citizenship fully or correctly (European 
Commission, n.d. b), which suggests that there is a difference in the perception of the directive 
between the Member States and the EU organization. 
 
One of the controversial provisions is Article 7, as it extends the rights of a worker to his/her 
family, which can be viewed as problematic in unison with Article 7(1-2) of the previously 
mentioned Regulation No (EEC) No 1612/68 that states: 
 
1. A worker who is a national of a Member State may not, in the territory of 
another Member State, be treated differently from national workers by reason of 
his nationality in respect of any conditions of employment and work, in 
particular as regards remuneration, dismissal, and should he become 
unemployed, reinstatement or re-employment; 
2. He shall enjoy the same social and tax advantages as national workers. 
 
These two articles combined were interpreted as; not only does the host state have to pay the 
appropriate social benefits to a worker from another Member State. The host state would also have 
to extend the rights to social benefits to the workers' family, even if they did not provide any benefit 
to that state or possibly did not even live in the same country. Article 24 of this particular directive 
has also been brought before the ECJ because it in some cases grants the rights to students to seek 
student grants and loans, if they wish to study in another Member State. However, this issue is 
assessed later in this analysis. 
 
As the Citizenship Directive was passed just days before the enlargement happened, it would seem 
that the EU15 wanted to tighten the rules for migrating workers' access to their labour market and 
social benefits before the new Member States could influence the decision. However, this does not 
seem to be the case, as the directive made it easier to take up residence in another Member State and 
to receive welfare benefits in the host country (Ochel, 2010: 328). This can perhaps be explained by 
considering the judgements from the ECJ. The fact that the assessment of whether a person is a 
social burden is not specified leaves room for interpretation. As essentially rational actors, one 
 Page 55 af 83 
 
could assume that an aspiration of the Council would be to enable their own interpretations of the 
directive, and thus maintain some of their national autonomy. However, the ECJ has largely 
rejected a strict interpretation of the directive, so it would seem that the intentions of the Council 
have backfired in this regard, which could be seen as unintended consequences. 
 
7.5 Path Dependence in the Context of Enlargement 
The Eastern enlargement had some implications for the social policy area regarding social benefits 
because the enlargement, along with earlier ECJ rulings, urged the Member States to pass new 
legislation regarding social benefits and free movement for Union citizens. The purpose of this 
legislation could broadly be characterized as attempting to restrict the possibilities for Union 
citizens, especially those from the CEE Member States, to receive benefits in a host state. Due to 
the enlargement and the apparent gap between old and new Member States in regards to wages, 
living standards and social security, the EU15 would want to impose some restrictions, to protect 
national welfare systems. 
 
The path of social policy on benefits did not change in any remarkable way to a more restrictive 
one, with the exception of the temporary transitional restrictions for the ascending states. This is 
because they were restricted by the ECJ, who effectively ruled in favour of the path already laid 
down. The institutional framework under which the Member States acted was held in place by the 
ECJ, despite of the preferences of these actors. 
 
7.6 Interim Conclusion 
Some benefits for both the EU15 and the ascending states from the enlargement is exhibited. 
However, there was also concerns, as viewed through the implementation of the Directive 
2004/38/EC and the transitional restrictions, which was imposed on the new Member States, with 
the exception of Malta and Cyprus, that the free movement of workers could potentially become a 
strain on national welfare systems. 
 
These policies, as previously explained, give the EU15 the chance to impose restrictions on the 
influx of workers from the new Member States for up to seven years after the enlargement. 
Simultaneously, they can require incoming workers to be self-sustaining and not to be a burden on 
the social security systems. This shows that the preferences of the EU15 were to some extent 
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protectionist about their national welfare systems, even though they welcomed the new Member 
States to the Union. However, this is not necessarily a new development, as the same type of 
transitional restrictions was imposed on previously ascending Member States, when Greece, Spain 
and Portugal were admitted into the EU. 
 
The ECJ interpreted on the initiatives taken by the Member States. The actions of the ECJ in 
regards to their interpretation of the Citizenship Directive seemed to impose some unintended 
consequences for the EU15, as it seems to have been interpreted more broadly and unfavourably to 
the Member States by the ECJ than seemed intended by the Council, when adopting it. In the 
context of the theory, the critical juncture of the Eastern enlargement has not been enough to change 
the path of European social policy, even though the Member States as rational actors seem to have 
other preferences than the ones being pursued. The institutional framework held in place by 
especially the ECJ has, in relation to the enlargement, proven too persistent. 
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8. Post-Citizenship Directive (IV) 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This part of the analysis examines the following hypothesis;  
 
Despite the implementation of the Citizenship Directive, the ECJ still exhibits 
judicial activism, which has caused dissatisfaction among some of the Member 
States due to the Eurozone crisis and the end of transitional restrictions.  
 
This is assessed by exploring the effect of four distinctive factors, which happened subsequently to 
the implementation of the Citizenship Directive. The first factor is the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty 
that went into force in 2009. The second is the following rulings by the ECJ based on the 
Citizenship Directive, and the third and fourth is the termination of the transitional restrictions and 
the Eurozone crisis, respectively. All of these have in some way changed either the balance of 
power between the Member States and the EU organizations, or affected the preferences of the 
actors involved in social policy making on the EU level. By examining the resulting implications 
from these four factors in the context of European social policy, this analysis provides a view on the 
development that has taken place in the last decade. This will, in conjunction with the findings from 
the previous analyses, provide a historical overview, which will be used in the conclusion. 
 
8.2 The Lisbon Treaty 
Firstly, the effects of the Treaty of Lisbon will be assessed. After the rejection of the Constitutional 
Treaty of Europe from 2004, the Treaty of Lisbon was initiated, which amends the EC and EU 
treaties, while not replacing these (Church & Phinnemore, 2013: 44). The Lisbon Treaty did not 
include many innovations itself; it included only 7 new articles. However, it included many 
amendments to existing articles, as well as some binding protocols. 
 
The competences of the EU remained the same; shared competences with the Member States (The 
European Union, 2010b). Thereby, most areas of the broader understanding of social policy were 
under the QMV decision-making (Leibfried 2010: 258). This makes the argument of Leibfried and 
 Page 58 af 83 
 
Pierson (1995) including that many social policy areas are constrained by coalitions consisting of 
few Member States, which can create obstructions and joint-decision traps, as well as lowest-
common denominator agreements, less valid. Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon explicitly describes 
the Member States‟ commitment to pursue economic, territorial and social cohesion in Article 2 of 
the Treaty (Allen, 2010: 242). It recognizes the social values of the founding treaties and includes 
new objectives. Additionally, it provides the rights of citizens described in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which includes rights such as social security, the right to strike and health care 
- areas that were traditionally linked to the national welfare states (The European Union, 2010b). In 
that respect, the integration has developed to a stage in which these rights are officially introduced 
in the Treaties. 
 
Furthermore, the treaty included a declaration emphasizing the significance that the EU attaches to 
social progress and protection of workers‟ rights, public services, education and the family (Church 
& Phinnemore, 2013: 50). The competences of the ECJ were simultaneously extended to include 
acts of all institutions, except from those specified in the treaties, which is a great expansion 
compared to the previously specific areas of jurisdiction (Kapsis, 2013: 174). However this 
development of the ECJ has little influence in the policy field of social policy, as this was 
previously comprised under the community pillar. The main aim of the Lisbon Treaty was to make 
the EU more efficient and legitimate, and it can be considered a second attempt to realize the 
reforms of the constitutional treaty (Church & Phinnemore, 2013: 51) that was rejected in several 
national referendums. 
 
8.3 ECJ rulings after the implementation of the Citizenship Directive 
As previously explained in section 7.3 The Citizenship Directive, the reasons for introducing the 
Citizenship Directive were partly to make the rules for social benefits and free movement of Union 
citizens easier to enforce and understand, and partly to put an end to the precedent set by the ECJ in 
the case of Sala. However, the directive is not quite as clear as the Member States could have hoped 
for; this is especially evident, when considering the joined cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras. 
The German court of Sozialgericht Nürnberg asked the ECJ, if it was possible to exclude job-
seekers from other Member States from receiving certain benefits (Press Release No 48/09, 2009). 
In these conjoined cases, the subjects were two Greek nationals, who were not workers according to 
the German court, but there was still doubt about whether they could be refused job-seekers 
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allowance in relation to the principle of equal treatment (Article 12 EC) of the treaties, mentioned in 
Article 24(1) of the Citizenship Directive. The ECJ held in that regard that: 
 
A job-seeker who has established genuine links with the labour market of a 
member state can receive a benefit of a financial nature intended to facilitate 
access to employment Independently of its status under national law, such a 
benefit is not „social assistance‟ which member states may refuse to job-seekers 
(Press Release No 48/09, 2009) 
 
The effect of this ruling was that the social assistance mentioned in Art. 24(2), which was perhaps 
meant to encompass all forms of social benefits, was ruled to not cover job-seekers assistance. The 
ECJ had thusly by this ruling differentiated the broadly defined term social assistance not to include 
benefits intended to facilitate job-seekers‟ access to employment. The implications of this is both 
that job-seeking citizens become entitled to benefits before the three months limit set in Article 
24(2), they would also automatically have the right to reside in a host state for six months, without 
being employed, as long as they can prove that they are genuinely seeking employment and have an 
actual chance of getting employed. 
 
This case can be seen as a more recent example of the extensive interpretation exercised by the ECJ. 
As previously argued in this project report, one of the probable reasons for the implementation of 
the Citizenship Directive was to ensure Member States not to be obliged to confer social benefits 
for at least the first three months of residence for migrants. This was severely diluted by this 
judgement. The ECJ interprets the term social assistance "(...) in view of the establishment of 
citizenship of the Union and the interpretation of the right to equal treatment enjoyed by citizens of 
the Union" (Case C-22/08 & C-23/08 Vatsouras). By referring to its own, rather extensive, 
interpretation of the right to equal treatment, its practice of precedent makes it hold on to an 
interpretation from a different point in time. 
 
Furthermore, this particular case shows that the ECJ interpreted on grounds of previous case law 
that is dated before the directive itself, as it continues:  
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(...) it is no longer possible to exclude from the scope of Article 39(2) EC a 
benefit of a financial nature intended to facilitate access to employment in the 
labour market of a Member State (Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-2703, 
paragraph 63, and Ioannidis, paragraph 22). 
(Case C-22/08 & C-23/08 Vatsouras) 
 
As referred to in the judgement:  
 
It is, however, legitimate for a Member State to grant such an allowance only 
after it has been possible to establish a real link between the job-seeker and the 
labour market of that State (Case C-224/98 D‟Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191, 
paragraph 38, and Ioannidis, paragraph 30).  
The existence of such a link can be determined, in particular, by establishing 
that the person concerned has, for a reasonable period, in fact genuinely sought 
work in the Member State in question (Collins, paragraph 70). 
(Case C-22/08 & C-23/08 Vatsouras) 
 
An important aspect in this judgment is that the cases referred to, both Collins and D‟Hoop, were 
concluded prior to the adoption of the Citizenship Directive by the Council. Therefore, it would be 
reasonable to expect the ECJ not to base their rulings in the precedent set in these, since new 
legislation exists. 
 
On the basis of this case, it would seem that the ECJ is determined to reinforce its informal 
institutions. This is both in terms of interpreting vaguely phrased provisions in the most 
integrationist sense and valuing the objectives of the free movement and the corresponding rights 
higher than the preferences of the Member States, but also in terms of reinforcing the practices of 
referring to previous case law, thus establishing an informal system of precedent. Furthermore, its 
choice of previous case law is conspicuous. When reflecting on previous cases, where it attempted 
to preclude specific benefits from the scope of social assistance, the cases that caused trouble in the 
1970‟s and 1980‟s comes to mind, which are described in the section 5.3 The Development of Social 
Policy in the 1970‟s. Despite of the turbulence, these cases ultimately ended up reinforcing the 
interpretations laid down by the ECJ by the assistance of the Commission. 
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In 2013, several recent rulings from the ECJ on the subject of financial aid for moving students 
indicated similar considerations. In all these cases, which include Danish, Luxembourgian, German, 
Dutch and Austrian cases, the ECJ decided that it to some extent was appropriate of the host 
countries to demand a certain link to the concerned host state (Myklebust, 2013). However, the 
same conditions had to be met by both nationals and migrants in order to comply with Article 18 
TFEU concerning non-discrimination on the basis of nationality in relation to the rules in 
Citizenship Directive. 
 
The type of requirements, which are allowed for the Member States to establish, depends on 
whether it can be justified, and whether the measures are proportionate. The ECJ's interpretation of 
this justifiability of a link to a host state can be exemplified in the case C-158/07 Förster where the 
ECJ have seemingly decided that it, to some extent, is appropriate for a Member State to demand 
this link and/or certain conditions regarding study aid such as student grants and loans. The Förster 
case concerns a German citizen, who was denied study finance in the Netherlands, because she had 
not been resident in the host state for a period of five years, which was required from migrant 
students by Dutch law. Even though these rules did not extend to Dutch citizens, the ECJ ruled it 
not to be discriminating, and thus justified in accordance with EU law (Chalmers et al., 2010: 458f). 
This is unusual in case law because other similar cases, like the aforementioned ECJ rulings, had 
determined that the requirements established by Member States would have to apply to both 
national and migrant students. 
 
From the case of Förster, it can be concluded that even though the ECJ is largely judicially activist 
in its promotion of free movement and citizens‟ rights, some limitations are applicable to how far 
the ECJ wants to regulate national autonomy on the social policy area, when it comes to these types 
of cases. However, it also exemplifies that the rules are grounded in wordings that necessitates 
interpretation. One could argue that the vague phrases such as "proportionality" and the lack of 
definitions on terms such as "worker" and "social assistance" has a double effect; it provides the 
ECJ with a high level of autonomy in the interpretation of the law, and at the same time it prompts 
the national courts to refer more cases to the ECJ through the preliminary ruling procedure.  
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8.4 The Eurozone Crisis and the End of the Transitional Restrictions 
The Eurozone crisis is a regionalised extension of the global financial crisis, which began in 2008, 
when the American investment bank Lehmann Brothers declared bankruptcy. The crisis in the EU 
has taken shape in different ways. Perhaps most critically when, among others, Greece and Cyprus 
came dangerously close to going bankrupt, and had to receive massive bailouts from mainly the 
European Central Bank and Germany. This crisis especially impacted the countries of the Eurozone, 
and to a slightly lesser extent the Member States not taking part in the Euro. It has led to most 
Member States implementing extensive austerity measures, and by extension cutting down on 
national welfare systems (Pietras, n.d.). This is a major reason why the Member States are 
concerned about welfare tourism.  
 
The transitional restrictions permanently ended for the CEE countries of the 2004 enlargement no 
later than 2011 and as for the two countries joining in 2007, Romania and Bulgaria, they ended by 
the end of 2013. This sparked the debate on welfare tourism because many politicians did not feel 
that their countries were prepared for the expected influx of migrant workers from the CEE Member 
States (Oleszczuk, 2014). They also feared that, due to the judicial activism, which the ECJ had 
exercised both before and after the implementation of the Citizenship Directive (see section 8.3 ECJ 
Rulings after the Implementation of the Citizenship Directive), it would be very difficult for the 
Member States to deny most kinds of social assistance to migrating Union citizens. This concern 
was to some extend amplified by the ongoing Eurozone crisis, which, as previously explained, had 
already been draining national economies and welfare systems for some time. As the end of the 
transitional restrictions coincided with the Eurozone crisis, this sequence of events only served to 
reinforce the pre-existing scepticism towards the development of European social policy.  
 
8.4.1 The Debate on Welfare Tourism 
The growing dissatisfaction has recently led to several reactions from different Member States, 
expressing concerns for the sustainability of their welfare systems under the changed circumstances 
of recent events. A letter delivered to the Irish EU Presidency in 2013 by four member states 
Austria, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom, serves as an example. In the letter they 
express their concerns regarding fraudulent use of the right of free movement, and request the 
Council Presidency to put this issue on the agenda of the next Justice and Home Affairs meeting 
(Friedrich et al., 2013). Furthermore, they argue that rules allowing people to attain benefits in 
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countries they have never worked or paid taxes in, are "an affront to common sense and ought to be 
reviewed urgently" (Friedrich et al., 2013: 3). As a respond to the letter, the Visegrad countries - 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia - made a joint statement on the free movements of 
persons. In their joint statement, the Visegrad countries acknowledge the importance of the free 
movement of persons, and request that measures to be taken within this context should be 
“compatible with the legal requirement of the European Union” (Kohout et al. 2013). 
 
The ongoing debate among Member States on the free movement of persons, and the according 
rights, can roughly be divided into two oppositions; the EU15 countries and the ascending 
countries, respectively.  The EU15 countries worry about the negative impacts of the free 
movement of persons, which is the possible abuse of benefit claims, and thus argues for limitations 
on benefit claims from EU migrants (Friedrich et al., 2013). The ascending countries argue that the 
effects of the free movement of persons are beneficial for both sides (Kohout et al. 2013). Hence, 
agreement on restrictions within this field can be hard to achieve with the Visegrad countries at the 
table within the Council.  
 
8.4.2 Implications on European Social Policy 
In theoretical terms, one could argue that the sequence of events, being the emergence of the 
Eurozone crisis followed by the end of the transitional restrictions on Romania and Bulgaria, can 
decidedly change the path of European social policy integration. The Eurozone crisis could be an 
example of an exogenous shock leading to negative feedback processes and ultimately change the 
path laid down. At the time of writing, this has not happened, which there can be some different 
reasons for; the first of which can relate to path dependence. As previously examined, the path of 
social policy integration of the Union began with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 in by the 
establishment of the freedom of movement for workers and the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality. Since the Treaty of Rome, the path of developing this policy field further has 
been locked in, and has reached a point where the transaction costs are simply too high to make 
large-scale changes possible.  
 
Additionally, the examined events took place very late in the overall process, which has made the 
path more resistant to changes, thus it is harder for these events to have an effect on the course of 
the path. Furthermore, the Member States have found themselves in a court-decision trap, as the 
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ECJ has to some extent taken over the policy-making regarding social policy, due to the weak 
formulations in the treaties and the Citizenship Directive. Authority granted to, or taken over by, the 
ECJ regarding social policy, can only effectively be reclaimed by the Member States with 
considerable changes to the constitutional basis of the EU, that is, the treaties, which has created 
this court-decision trap.  This has made it nearly impossible for the Member States to change the 
current path (Martinsen & Falkner, 2011: 19); an opportunity, which was missed with the Treaty of 
Lisbon, where the ECJ if anything gained more power, albeit not in the social policy area. 
Moreover, it can be argued that, as the ECJ is not affected by economic trends and public pressure 
to the same extent as the rest of the EU organisations and Member States are, these events have not 
implored the ECJ to discontinue or pause the development of European social policy.  
 
8.5 Interim Conclusion 
As the judicial activism of the ECJ is not dependent on economic conjunctures, the activism of ECJ 
has become more evident as the Member States adjust their national welfare states to the Eurozone 
crisis. This has reinforced the dissatisfaction among some Member States, as they try to protect own 
interests and national welfare systems. What is significant about the ECJ regarding this is its 
propensity to value prior case law precedence over new legislation as laid down in the Citizenship 
Directive, thus eroding the preferences of the Member States. Thereby it has continued to judge 
according to its own preferences, despite the purpose of the Citizenship Directive.   
 
The sequence of the Eurozone crisis and the termination of the transitional restrictions on especially 
Bulgaria and Romania only reinforced the dissatisfaction among particularly the older Member 
States. In this regard, the older Member States have focused on the negative aspects of the European 
social policy, which have become more and more evident along with the crisis. As the Member 
States have put themselves in a Court-decision trap, changes to the path laid down by the ECJ are 
hard to change, as it requires changes to the treaties.    
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9. Discussion (V) 
 
 
This discussion considers the findings of the analyses in a broader perspective and the consequences 
that these factors have for the EU and European social policy. This is done in order to increase the 
understanding of the impact, both positive and negative, which the ECJ has in regard to the 
development of the common social policy. 
 
In this project report, it is discovered that the ECJ has gained considerable authority and autonomy 
on the European social policy area, necessitated mostly because of functional spillover, stemming 
from the economic cooperation and the internal market as well as the extensive vaguely formulated 
legislation, respectively. The free movement of workers made it imperative for the Union to also 
develop some sort of social security cooperation. As the Member States were largely reluctant to 
implement such measures effectively, the ECJ filled the voids by exercising judicial creativity and 
thereby expand this policy area effectively as well as their own autonomy. Over time, this 
development has left the Member States with few options for increasing their own autonomy in this 
regard, as the ECJ have amassed progressively more power over this policy area.  
 
As previously analyzed, the activism of the ECJ has been more or less necessary because of the 
relative political impasse in developing European social policy early on. Through the judgements of 
the ECJ and the implicated effects of these, the development has been driven forward in areas, 
which the Member States could or would not decide on collectively. This can be considered helpful 
in ensuring that the integration process of the EU keeps moving forward. Likewise, the judgements 
of the ECJ has, as several of those covered in the analysis indicates, extended the prohibition on 
discrimination of Union citizens to apply more broadly, and furthermore secured benefits for e.g. 
Union citizens studying or desiring to seek a job in another Member State. Similarly, one could 
argue that the free movement of workers would not be as effective, if some basic forms of social 
security were not ensured. Therefore, the ECJ as a driving force, when the Member States were 
reluctant or unable to act, could be interpreted as beneficial in many ways. 
 
However, from the perspective of the Member States, it can be argued that the ECJ has attained too 
much influence on the design of social policy. This can foremost be illustrated by the debate on 
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welfare tourism. Regarding the relationship between ECJ and Member State authority, it is not 
relevant to consider to what extend the issue of benefit tourism is exaggerated or an actual problem, 
as this relates to the power of the ECJ. After all, the issue at hand would be the limits to Member 
States' scope of action when trying to prevent welfare tourism. A court-decision trap is created in 
which the ECJ through case law limits the opportunities of Member States to implement restrictive 
measures on a national level regarding social assistance granted to non-national Union citizens. 
 
Furthermore, the debate on benefit tourism could intensify the EU-scepticism of certain Member 
States and their populations, if the EU, through ECJ case law, seems to take away supremacy, and 
at the same time allowing CEE Union citizens to benefit from more well-developed Member States‟ 
social security systems. A possible result of this could be a "race to the bottom", where Member 
States impair and restrict their respective social systems in order to attract as few migrants as 
possible. 
 
Thus, the development viewed in the analyses can be interpreted in both negative and positive 
ways, as the ECJ ensures action in the event of inertia, while perhaps challenging the sovereignty of 
the Member States or leading to questions of legitimacy, which can lead to an intensification of EU-
scepticism. 
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10. Conclusion 
 
Throughout this project report, the development of social policy, the ECJ‟s accumulation of power 
within this area, as well as how the Member States have approached this, is examined. This is 
examined in order to understand the current dissatisfaction among Member States and the fear of 
welfare tourism on the basis of a historical institutionalist approach. The foundation of the project 
report is the following problem formulation;  
 
How has the ECJ accumulated such an extent of power on the European social 
policy area, and how come the Member States have allowed it? 
 
On the basis of the analyses conducted in the project report, it can be concluded that the ECJ has 
accumulated its extent of power on the basis of vague treaty articles, political inertia, and its ability 
to interpret cases expansively. Furthermore, the spillover process from the economic integration 
into the social policy area has also taken place in the judicial realm, and allowed the ECJ to impact 
on more policy areas, including social policy.  
 
In the time period between the Treaties of Rome and Maastricht, the ECJ successfully established 
its practices and extended its authority, as well as autonomy. This included establishing supremacy 
of EU law, an informal system of precedent, and a consistent, teleological method of interpretation. 
These efforts were continually reinforced due to the lack of consensus amongst the Member States, 
which impeded their ability to overturn judgments. The inability to make agreements led to vague 
formulations, which had a double effect in expanding the power of the ECJ; it made room for 
extensive interpretations, and at the same time it caused the national courts to refer cases more 
often. Thus, the Member States‟ difficulties to agree on narrow formulation allowed the ECJ to 
expand its powers.  
 
Furthermore, the freedom of movement for workers was from the beginning connected to economic 
integration, but gradually it spilled over into the social policy area. A precondition for the freedom 
of movement for workers to function as intended was the prohibition of discrimination on grounds 
of nationality - which was gradually interpreted more extensively by the ECJ. In order to ensure this 
free movement, some extent of social security should be established politically. This led to, albeit 
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limited, further integration of the social policy area, which offered an opportunity for the ECJ to 
decide in this area; and thus leading to more integration. Thereby, the ECJ attained more influence.  
 
Although the Member States have expressed dissatisfaction occasionally through time, and 
overruled a judgment by the ECJ in 1992, the power of the ECJ was reinforced by means of the 
Commission. This, along with the requirement of unanimity for an overruling of an ECJ 
interpretation of secondary law, expresses how the path established for the ECJ is difficult to 
change. The establishment of Union citizenship was indeed a key event in the integration process, 
and the ECJ was a key player in ensuring that it ended up having a crucial role. Expansive 
interpretations, read in conjunction with the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, 
led to limitations of Member State autonomy as a means of ensuring equal treatment of Union 
citizens.  
 
Just before the enlargement, most of the older Member States imposed transitional restrictions, and 
the Citizenship Directive was adopted. However, the ECJ applied the teleological interpretation 
method to cases related to the directive, and read the provisions in the light of earlier legislation and 
case law dated before the directive. Thus, it is argued, they interpreted beyond the intentions of the 
Member States, impacting national legislation and the Member State autonomy. Through the 
development, a greater extent of power was attained by the ECJ. The Member States, albeit not 
intentionally, allowed this development, which they are now dissatisfied with. Thus, the Member 
States might have put themselves in a court-decision trap in which the path of the ECJ is difficult to 
change, and the ECJ rules more on the basis of precedent rather than Member State preferences. 
 
Conclusively, two parallel processes are identified in the study. Due to the processes of repeated 
increasing returns and functional spillover over a long time period in the political sphere, 
fundamental legislation, such as the right to freedom of movement and the corresponding 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, the Union citizenship and the associated 
rights, and the incorporation of social assistance in the European policy sphere, have become so 
institutionalized that they are difficult to change. The second process takes point of departure in the 
judicial realm in which the vaguely phrased legislation of the EU has led to extensive 
interpretations by the ECJ, and through positive feedback processes, these practices have been 
institutionalized and recognized in the political realm. Furthermore, the constitutionalization of 
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treaty articles and the judicialization of politics have integrated the case law of the ECJ into the 
formal institutions, the body of law. This process has made it increasingly difficult for the Member 
States to change the path.  
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11. Reflections 
 
 
The purpose of this section is partly to reflect on the potential weaknesses, or blind spots, that can 
be identified in research method or strategy, but also to outline the strengths. This aims to reflect 
our considerations about the validity of the work done and the research strategy of the project. 
Additionally, these reflections and considerations should clarify how the project report can 
contribute scientifically, and thus further strengthen the validity of the study.  
 
The main focus of the project report is the macro-level of analysis, which allows for considerations 
of the broader causal processes, whereas the micro-level processes are largely deselected. The 
macro-level aspect is mainly illustrated by the extensive timeframe, however with a necessary 
delimitation on the number of EU organizations. This is done in order to comprehend the reasons 
for this development, and by limiting the number of EU organizations, a more comprehensive in-
depth analysis can be conducted. Through this approach, the study includes more factors, and 
creates a broad understanding of the causality of the development of ECJ authority. The broader 
understanding, which is attained through this macro-level analysis, allows for an understanding of 
the process through which the ECJ has attained more power. This analysis of the macro-level and 
the development over a longer period of time is very compatible to the historical institutionalist 
approach. However, this approach does not allow for many micro-level aspects, in which some 
potentially triggering aspects can be overlooked.  
 
The theory is applied to fill in the voids, and thereby plays an important part in the analysis. With 
the right amount of resources, some micro-level aspects could have been included; e.g. the issue 
could be examined on a national level, providing a more nuanced study that perhaps would be less 
dependent on the explanatory powers of the theory. As the macro-level analysis aims to explain 
general patterns, it is relatively dependent on a theory that can provide a framework and serve as an 
explanatory power.  
 
Furthermore, the influence of other EU organizations, such as the Commission and the Parliament, 
is not investigated to any greater extent. The inclusion of the Commission could have contributed 
by offering the aspect of the powers of the Commission as a regulatory and agenda-setting player. 
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Also, it could potentially have provided e.g. some context for the judgements of the ECJ.  However, 
it would at the same time have divided the attention of the analysis too much relatively to the 
problem formulation, and made it difficult to provide a general answer about the ECJ‟s role. For the 
same reasons, national relations are not a part of the analysis. Thus, the focus on the ECJ simplifies 
the project report in order to thoroughly examine the path of this organization. 
 
Another potential weakness of this project report could be the focus on primary legislation and case 
law, rather than secondary legislation. Throughout our analysis, the focus has largely been on the 
development of institutional relations between the Council, hence Member States, on the one side, 
and the ECJ on the other side. Therefore, it is also largely primary law and case law that are 
examined in this context. These provide an overall context of the development. The most important 
secondary legislation in the context of the project report, particularly the Citizenship Directive, is 
researched, as it is necessary viewed in the context of case law and the judgements of the ECJ based 
on this piece of legislation. Even though some secondary legislation is included in order to 
understand the context, a greater involvement of secondary legislation could perhaps contribute to a 
deeper understanding of the development. 
 
As for the research method, it could have been useful to conduct expert interviews, as these could 
assist in the identification of certain causal effects or relevant actors, which otherwise might have 
been overlooked. Unfortunately, no experts were available to be interviewed, although several 
requests were made, which has been related to the contemporary relevance of the issue. This has 
necessitated a greater reliance in the project on books and reports for expert knowledge. However, 
due to the contemporary relevance of the subject, much relevant empirical data was available, 
which is an advantage for the study.  
 
Ideally, a historical institutionalist study would include an even broader and more comprehensive 
field of study, and in that regard more quantitative data would be necessary. One of the critiques of 
historical institutionalism is that the approach examines a path through a size of empirical data, 
which is not proportionate to the subject examined. However, the problem at hand, being the 
development of the power of the ECJ, does not suggest the use of quantitative data, which means 
that the findings of this project, though not statistically traceable, reach a deeper level of 
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understanding than an analysis mainly based in quantitative data could. The delimitations 
contributes to a more proportionate balance between data and field of research.  
 
Conclusively, some other aspects could improve the project report through the inclusion of other 
actors, quantitative data and micro-level. However, this project report contributes to a greater 
understanding of the accumulation of the ECJ‟s power on the basis of the historical development. 
This is approached through qualitative data, a macro-level, a limited amount of actors, as well as a 
historical institutionalist approach. 
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12. Call for Future Research 
 
 
The focus of this project is the development in European social policy regarding social assistance to 
Union citizens, in order to understand the interconnecting roles and actions of the Member States 
and the ECJ affecting this policy area. However, there is several alternative ways and additional 
cases to look at, which would contribute to a deepening of the understanding of this problem or the 
issues related to it. These have not been processed, either because they at the time of completion of 
this project were not yet settled, or because they fall outside of the main scope of the project report.  
 
The relevance of benefit tourism is evident due to the wide range of infringement procedures 
initiated by the Commission. Some Member States seek to restrict payments of benefits to EU-
migrants by introducing legislation that makes benefits conditional upon completion of periods of 
for example employment. Such legislation can be in breach of EU legislation as laid down in article 
61 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. Hence, the Commission have initiated infringement procedure 
against Finland. Other similar infringement procedures are taken against e.g. Germany and the 
United Kingdom, which at the time of this project‟s completion is not concluded. Therefore, it 
could be interesting to follow up on these cases.   
 
Another unsettled event is the upcoming election to the European Parliament and appointment of 
new Commission. As a consequence of the Eurozone crisis, the public debate on the EU in several 
countries has focused on the negative impacts of the EU, such as welfare tourism. Hence, Euro-
scepticism has attained ground in most countries. Therefore, future research needs to consider 
which impact the composition of the new Parliament and Commission has on future decisions 
within the EU institutions. 
 
On 1 July 2013 Croatia became the 28
th
 Member State of the EU, and some of the same transitional 
restrictions as was used during the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 were utilized here. When those 
are lifted, it could be relevant to examine whether the same debates arose again, and generally what 
the consequences could be for Croatia joining the Union. 
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One of the most vocal critics of the judicial activism of the ECJ, and the risk of benefit tourism in 
general, is the British Prime Minister David Cameron, and the British population is one of the most 
EU-sceptic in the Union. The debate on welfare tourism, especially after the end of the transitional 
restriction, emerged largely from the UK because of a fear that Romanian and Bulgarian migrants 
would travel to the UK with the purpose of attaining social benefits. Therefore, the situation in the 
UK could be interesting to research further in different ways. Firstly, the number of migrants from 
the CEE Member States, and the amount of benefits they receive, could be investigated to find out 
to what extend benefit tourism is a problem or not. Likewise, the UK‟s future role in the Union 
could be examined, as several indications of a wish to withdraw from the Union have been 
expressed. An example is the promise of David Cameron to impose a referendum on the UK‟s 
Membership of the EU, if he is re-elected as prime minister in 2015, and his wish to renegotiate the 
UK‟s relation to the EU (Watson, 2013). Thus, both on the basis of the reluctance towards EU 
Membership, as well as the great national debate about Welfare Tourism, the UK is an interesting 
subject in relation to this issue. 
 
In line with the focus, which one could impose on the implications of benefit tourism in the UK, it 
could be relevant to research the implications on other Member States, or perhaps the EU as a 
whole. It is seemingly mostly the EU15 Member States, which have lamented the development 
studied in this project, but a lot of the migrating citizens from e.g. Romania move to countries 
closer by, such as other CEE Member States. This development could potentially be intriguing to 
examine. Similarly, an examination of the consequences for the new Member States could be 
interesting. This could have the purpose of finding out if they suffer a brain-drain as educated 
people leave for better wages, and what the eventual effects of this could be.  
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